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Jill E. Fisch* 
I was sittmg m my office, debating whether to get a second 
cup of coffee before preparing for d ass, when the re was a knock 
at the d oor. I answered warily, anticipating yet another student 
who wanted me to "explain" why he or she had done poorly on 
the exam. Although the face at the door was vag"uely familia r, it 
did not belong to one of my students. 
"Rodrigo?"1 I asked hesitan tly. I could think of no reason why 
Rodrigo would be coming to see me and wondered hovt he could 
have become so confused as to be not only at the wrong 
professor's office, but at the wrong law school. 2 
"I see you are acquainted ·with my brother," the visitor re-
plied . "I am often mistaken for him as he is, of course, so well 
known among legal academics. I am Eduardo." 
''I' m pleased to meet you, Eduardo. I didn't realize there was 
* Associate Professor, Fordham University Sc hool of Law. B.A., Cornell University, 
1982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985. I am indebted to Richard Delgado and Bill Eskridge 
for their development and analysis o f the narrative form and for inspiring me to direct 
the use of narrative to a nontraditional setting-traditional doctrinal sc holarship. This 
articl e is, however, not the first to employ the dialogic meth od to explore the subject of 
fe deral courts. See Henry H art, The Power of Congress to Lhnit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953). Thanks are due to Marc 
Arkin, Mike Gerhardt, Dan Richman, Tony Sebok, Steve The!, Bill Treanor, and my 
mother for their helpful comments on earlie r drafts and to Richard Delgado both for his 
comments and for permission to use the Crenshaw fam ily personae. 
1 Rodrigo is the fiction al interlocutor and title character in the Rodrigo Chronicles, 
a series of nan·ative essays by Professor Richard Delgado. See Richard Delgado, Rod1igo's 
Chronicle, 101 YALE LJ. 1357 (1992); Richard Delgado , Rodrigo's Second Chronicle: The Ear 
nomics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 11 83 (1993); Richard Delgado, &drigo's Third 
Chronicle: Care, Competition, and the Redemptive Tragedy of Race, 81 CAL. L. REV. 387 (1 993) 
[hereinafter Delgado, &drigo 's Third Chronicle]; Richard Delgado, &drigo 's Fourth Chronicle: 
Neutrality and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L REv. 1133 ( 1993); Richard 
Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifth Chronicle: Civitas, Civil Wrongs, and the Politics of Denial, 45 STAN. L. 
REv. 158 1 ( 1993) [hereinafter Delgado, Rodrigo 's Fifth Chronicle]; Richard Delgado, &d1igo 's 
Sixth Chronicle: Intersections, Essences, and the Dile-m ma of Social Refonn, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 639 
( 1993); Richard Delgado, Rod1igo 's Seventh Chmnicie: Race, Democracy, and the State, 41 
UCLA L. REv. 721 ( 1994) ; Richard Delgado , Rodrigo 's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, vVhite 
Fears-On the Social Constmction of Threat, 80 VA. L REV. 503 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado, 
P.odrigo 's Eighth Chronicle]. 
2 The Professor, the questione r in th e Rodrigo dialogues, is also a fi ctional charac-
ter, described as "a man of color teach in g in a law school located in a large P...merican 
city ... . " Delgado , &drigo's Eighth Chronic!.e, stt,bra note l, at 504 n.3. 
325 
326 NOTR_E DAME L<\W REVIEW [Vo l. 70:2 
another member of the Crenshaw family. 3 What brings you h ere?" 
"Rodrigo suggested I seek you out. I have a problem and 
could use your advice. " 
''Y b • k ' J: h p C T j..., ou must e rmsta. 1ng me 10r t e rmessor. 1 !.ave no ex-
pertise in critical race theor1 or jurisprudence," I cautioned. 4 
Eduardo smiled. "l'-Jow you must be mistaking me for my 
brother. Mthough I too am a lawyer, I am not an academic. I 
practice iaw with the Legal Services Housing Project. My office is 
right down the street. But my question is not about landlo rd-ten-
ant law. I understand you have some expertise on the su bj ect of 
vacatur." 
I acknowledged tha t I had written on the subject.5 
"An in teresting problem has arisen in connection v-rith my 
representation of tenants in condemned buildings. I'd like your 
reaction. May I take a few minutes of your time?"6 
3 Eduardo and Rodrigo are half b.rothers of Geneva Crenshaw, the fictional activist 
civil rights attorney described in DERRJCK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSNE 
QUEST FOR R-\CL'\L JUSTICE ( 1987). For personal background on Rodrigo , see Delgado, 
Rodrigo's Third Chronicle, supra note 1, at 387 n.l. Like his siblings, Eduardo is a fictional 
composite, reflecting concerns and observations expressed to me over the P<'-'t several 
years in connection with my work on vacatur. 
4 Rodrigo's discussions with the Professor have focused on critical race theory. In 
the past, the narrative form has been used primarily by nontraditional legal scholars 
speaking as outsiders to standard legal norms. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narra-
tives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607, 608-09 (1994) (recounting examples and typical subject areas 
of narrative scholarship). For further reflections on the role of narrative in legal scholar-
ship, see Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Nmrative, 87 
MICH. L. REv. 2411 ( 1989); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of 
Dimitri Yurasov: Further &j?ections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1994); 
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sheri)', Telling St01ies out of School: An Essay on Legal Narra-
tives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993). 
5 See Jill E. Fisch, Captive Cowts: The Destr11ction of Judicial Decisions by Ag•eemmt of the 
Parties, 2 N.Y.U. Ei\'VTL. LJ. 191 (1993) [hereinafter Fisch, Captive Courts] (analyzing use 
of vacatur and related processes to destroy environmental Jaw decisions); Jill E. Fisch, 
F.eurriting History: The Propriety of Eradicating Prior Decisional Law Through Settlement and Vaca-
tur, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 589 ( 1991) [hereinafter Fisch, Rewriting History] (using economic 
analysis to examine process of post-trial settlement and vacatur). In the interests of full 
disclosure , I also informed Eduardo that I had written two briefs as Punicus Curiae to the 
U.S. Supreme Court on the propriety of rules permitting routine vacatur o f cases settled 
during the appellate process. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Trial Lawyers for Public Justice 
in Support of Pe titioner, Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Y~isha v. United States Philips 
Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (No. 92-1123); Brief of Amicus Curiae Trial Lawyers for 
Public Justice, P.C. in Support of Respondent, United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. 
Bonner Mall Pa rtnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. C t. 681 (1994) 
(No. 93-714). 
5 Eduardo shares his bro ther's appreciation for the utility of dialogue as a form of 
analysis, see, e.g., Delgado, Rndrigo's Eighth Chronicle, supra note 1, at 531, to such a degree 
that h e is willing to take the tool beyond its traditional role as a means of adding out-
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"Of course," I replied . "\Vould you like some coffee while we 
talk? I'm afraid I can't offer you the Professor's esp:resso,7 but our 
faculty lounge has a serviceable coffee machine ." 
"I'd love some coffee, thank you. Black, please." 
We settled back with matching mugs of strong black coffee, 
and Eduardo began to recount his story. 
l. DEFENDING THE HOMELESS OR HOW 
EDUARDO ENCOUNTERS VACATUR 
"For the past two years," Eduardo explained, "my office has 
been involved in litigation on behalf of a group of homeless ten-
ants wh o are living in a condemned apartment building. In de-
fe nding the tenants against government action, ..,,;e have argued 
that the tenants, although squatters, have various privacy and prop-
erty rights in their housing that the government must respect."8 
"Didn't I read something about this case in the Times?" 
"Probably. Last summer we went to trial in the Southern Dis·· 
trict, and the court found in favor of our clients. The case was a 
significant victory for the homeless and was prominently men-
tioned in the press." 
sider perspectives and social commen~ry and extend it to more traditional legal analys is. 
Eduardo's insight is not unprecedented. Legal scholars have valued th e dialogic form for 
hundreds of years. See, e.g., PLA.TO, THE REPL' BLIC (F. Cornfeld trans. 1945) (describing 
Socrates' use of dialogic questioning). Indeed, Socratic questioning remains the dominant 
educational method employed by American law schools. 
7 In keeping with the Professor's urbane image, his office contains such accoutre-
ments as a compact refrigerator and a machine that grinds beans and prepares freshly-
made espresso. See, e.g. , Delgado, Rodrigo's Third Chronicle, supra note 1, a t 388. One com-
mentator has read these possessions to indicate that the Professor has "sold out." See 
Ric hard Posner, Legal Scholarship and Disciplinary• Politics: Discussion, 45 STAN. L. REV. 167 1, 
1680 (1993). 
8 The litigation described by Eduardo is ficti onal although both the subject matter 
and the vacatur issue are based on events that have occurred in real litigation. See, e.g., 
Man~ne H owe, Squ atters Brace as City Focuses on East 13th StTeet, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1994, 
§ 13, at 5 (discussing City's efforts to evict long-term squatters from city-owned build-
ings). For a general discussion of litigation on behalf of the right of the homeless to live 
on public property, see Andrea Sachs, A Right to Sleep Outside ?, 79 A. B.A. ].. Aug. 1993, at 
38. For an example of an attempt to use vacatur to remove precede nts important to 
public interes t litigation , see J oint Motion to Grant the Petitions for a \Vrit of Certiorari, 
Vacate the J udgment of the Court of Appeals, and Remand with Directions to Vacate the 
J udgment of th e District Cou rt and to Remand the Case to the District Coun for Con-
sideration of the Parties' Settlement Agreemen t, Shalala v. Sc hoolcraft, 11 4 S. Ct. 902 
(1994) (Nos. 92-1 392, 92-1395) [hereinafter J oint Motion , Schoo!crajl] (requestin g Court to 
vacate lower court decision upholdin g jurisdiction of federal courts to re,~ew manner in 
which government evaluated claims for disability benefits); see olso S<:hoolcr<:>.ft v. Sullivan, 
971 F.2d 81 (8th Cir. 1992). 
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"If your litigation was successful, what is the problem? Is the 
city refusing to comply with the terms of the decision?" 
"Not at all," Eduardo replied. "In fact, follmving the trial 
court decision, various government officials met wi th us and 
worked out housing p lacements for the tenants. Our dients are no 
u " 
longer squatters, and the case has become moot.9 I think the 
government was concerned, especially in an electio n year, about 
the publicit'j generated by the decision. The housing officia ls want-
ed us to acknowledge publicly that the tenants' h ousing problem 
had been addressed, which we did." 
"It soun ds as if you were able to reach a so!u tion that met 
everyone's needs," I observed. 
"It seemed that way to me as well. But apparently the govern-
ment does not fed that it can iive with the trial court decision. 
The privacy rights established by our case would require the gov-
ernment to change its policies for treatment of the homeless in a 
num ber of d ifferent ways. Although it provided our clients with 
appropriate housing, the government simultaneously filed a notice 
of appeal. Now the government lawyers have approached me and 
asked if we will agree to settle the case and move to have the trial 
court decision vacated. I'm not sure I understand what the signifi-
cance of vacatur would be or why, if the case is moot, either set-
tlement or vacatur is necessary." 
H. MAKING DECISIONS DISAPPEAR OR HOW EDUA.WO 
LEARNS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VACATUR 
''I'm not surprised at your lack of familiar ity with the practice 
of postsettlement vacatur," I said. "Until several years ago, 
postsettlement vacatur was virtually unknown in the profession. 
Those who were using vacatur to destroy decisions and manipu late 
case law were doing so in secret." 10 
"We never talked about vacatur in law school," Eduardo ad-
mitted . "In fact, we discussed little in civil procedure other than 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, but I went to Yale you know. Where do courts 
9 Similarly, in Schoolcraft the plaintiffs were awarded disabiiity benefits while the 
litigation '..:as pending. The government then argued that the case was moot in an effort 
to prevent the Eigh th Circuit from address ing the jurisdictional issue. See Schoolcmft, 971 
F.2d at 83 n.3. 
10 For example, when I expiai ned the practice of postsettlemen t vacatur at a confer-
ence at New York Un iversi ty, the audience primarily indicated surprise at i~.s existence. See 
Colloquium on the Implications of Secrecy in Environmental Law, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. :REV. 187 
(1993) (publishing the proceedings of the Colloquium). 
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get the authority to vacate a final judgment?" 11 
"The federal courts have both inherent oower to vacate their 
own decisions and statutory power from a 
F d D c· n r·o r·• . " -. 1 • d as e .. rx . 1v . .!- . o , o)) 1 exp a1ne . 
"Do you mind if I tak,:: notes on this?" 
out a laptop computer. 
"~f' ' 11 1' , i d . d nat s rea. _y a sma 1 one, ~ a m1re . 
. 
variety of sources such 
Eduardo rapidly pulled 
- -
"It's been a time saver. So m uch of my practice involves field-
work, and I see so many dients in a day that I need to keep track 
of things as they happen. You ,,vere talking about the coun.s ' pow-
er to vacate?" 
"T he statutes and cmTnnon law suggest," I continued, "that 
vacatur is a means of addressing decisions that are defective or un-
. . ' b f 1 • t d l •. , ' JUSt, eitner ecause o~. tne Clrcums ances un er wmcn tney were 
rendered or because of subsequent events. For example, Rule 
60(b) allows a court, o n motion, to vacate a judgment obtained by 
fraud or mistake. 12 Cases also suggest that vacatur is pan of the 
cou r t' s inherent power over its own judgments."13 
"Appellate courts can also vacate lower court judgments, 
right?" Eduardo inquired. 
''Yes. The circuit courts and the United States Supreme Court 
both have the power to vacate lower court j udgments as part of 
their general power of review. 14 In many cases settled during the 
appellate process, the circuit court vacates the lower court judg-
11 A final j udgment can result from a trial verdict or the resolu tion o f a dispositive 
motion such as a motion for summary judgment. 
12 See FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b) (allowi ng relief, on motion, from a final judgment, or-
der or proceeding, for various reasons including fraud, mistake, newly discovered evi-
dence, or any other reason justil)·1ng rel ief) . The circuit courts have not reac hed agree-
ment on whether Rule 60( b) pe rmits courts to vacate sua sponte. See Clifton v. Attorney 
General, 997 F.2d 660, 664 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussi ng split in circuits). 
13 See, e.g., Chambers v. N.J\SCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (district court has 
inherent power "to vacate its 01m judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpe-
trated u pon the court"); In re First Fin. Dev. Corp ., 960 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1992) (vacat-
ing own prior opinion and holding, sua spon te, for lack of jurisdiction); Tucker v. Amer-
ican Sur. Co., 191 F.2d 959, 961 (5th Ci r. 1951) ("At common law a court has fu ll con-
trol over its orders or judgme nts during the te rm at which they are made, and may, on 
sufficient cause shown amend, correct, open, or vacate such judgments." (quoting 49 
CJ.S. judgments§ 229 (1947))); Wood Bros. Constr. Co. v. Yankton, 54 F.2d 304, 309-10 
(8th Cir. 1931) (discmsing inh erent power of court to vacate , sua sponte, judgment that 
is void fo r w2nt of jurisdiction or procured by fraud ). 
14 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1 994) provides: 
The Supreme Court or any other cou rt of appellate jurisdiction may affi rm , 
modify, vacate , set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court 
lawfully brought before it for review .... 
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ment. Vacatur is not limited to district court judgments; courts 
have been asked to vacate judgments after a circuit court decision 
and even after the Supreme Court has granted certiorari .15 As to 
tt~e effect of vacatur, the black le tter rule is that a vacated deci-
sion has no legal force or effect." 16 
"Vacatur makes sense if the court has ren dered a defective 
judgment," Eduardo observed, "such as when 2. litigant has de-
frauded the court. U nder those circumstances, it also makes sense 
that the decision shouid be completely eradicated . But I don't see 
how it follows that the same rules should apply if a case is mooted 
by settlement. Settlement doesn't necessarily indicate any defect 
with the und eriying judgment. 17 VV'ny should it be e rased simply 
because the parties decide to te rminate the litigation?" 
"Well, the possibility of seeking vaca tur wh;::n a case settled 
pending appeal stemmed from the Supreme Court's decision in a 
1950 case, United States v. J\t[unsingwear,"18 I explained. 
"Munsingwear was the second action brought by the government 
alleging that Munsingwear had violated a price-fixing regulation. 
The first ac tion had been dismissed as moot after an initial trial 
court judgment in favor of Munsingwear." 
"So the government decided to try again." 
"Yes. Munsingwear sought to have the second action dismissed 
based on the res judicata effect of the first judgment. 19 In opposi-
tion, the government argued that res judicata did not apply be-
cause the first case had become moot during the appellate pro-
cess.20 The Court refused to relieve the government from the res 
15 See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 
1993) (court asked to vacate judgment of the Second Circuit); infra notes 33-35 and 
accompanying text (describing settlement of BonniT Mall litigation after Supreme Court 
granted certiorari). 
16 See, e.g., Chandler v. System Council U-19, No. CV85-AR·l 948-S, slip op. at 4 
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 1 986), available in LEX IS, Genfed Library, Dist File ("A decision 
which is vacated has no precedential value, and for all intents and purposes never ex-
isted"). But see infra notes 71-73, 87 and accompanying text (discussing preclusive and 
precedential effect of vacated decisions). 
17 But see infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text (describing settlement as a possi-
ble response to an aberrational decision). 
18 340 u.s. 36 (1950). 
19 In the first sui t, the United States sought only injunctive relief. After the trial 
court found that Munsingwear's pricing complied with the regulation, the commodity in 
ques tion was deregulated, and Munsingwear successfully moved the court of appeals to 
dismiss the case as moot. The United States then filed a second suit, covering a later 
time period, and sought damages for violation of the regulation. See Munsingwear, 340 
U.S. at 37 (describing procedural histo ry of litigation). 
20 The cases are in conflict regarding the appropria te disposition of a case that be· 
.. , 
r .,.,., ... 
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judicata effect of the judgment, holding that it could have protect-
ed itself by having the first jtidgmerrt vacated when it became 
moot."2 1 
"That sounds more like a case about res judicata than about 
vacatur," Eduardo observed. 
"That's true," I acknowl-::d,gecL "The ;Vfunsinu;vear ommon ~ • "' - " c•' · c ' 
contains some broad langu~ge about vacatur, hovvever, suggesting 
that vacatur is the Court's no rrn al response to a case that becomes 
d . 1 1' 0 •) ~- h moot unng tne appellate process."·- .!. r-1e government 1 as recent-
ly argued to the Supreme Court that 1\!J.unsingwea-r stands for the 
1 . . ' . ' ' 1. • ' genera. proposrt10n tnat a court 1s requ m;a to vacate tne juagment 
in a case that becomes moot oendinrr6 aoDea.1 .
23 1-\nd there are 
l ! i 
some cases in which the Sumeme Court has followed that prac-
·' 
tice, al though without explicitly considering its propriety."2 1 
"That approach seems to go too far. Aren't most cases, even 
those that result in a trial court iudQ"ment, ultimately resolved by 
J u . 
settlement? And a litigant can always render a case moot by com-
plying with the terms of the judgment.25 It's not logical to re-
comes moot during th e appellate process. The general mootn ess doctrine requires d is-
missal unless one of several specified exceptions applies. See Kipp D. Snider, Note, The 
Vacatur Remedy for Cases Becoming Moot Upon Appeal: In Search of a Workable Solution f or the 
Federal Courts, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1642, 1643-46 (1992) (describing exceptions to 
mootness doctrine). 'Whether the court shouid also vacate its own judgment, or that of a 
lower court, when a case becomes moot, is less clear. See infra notes 22-26 and accompa-
n)~ng text. In determining whether mootness compels vacatur, courts have considered 
variously the ci rcumstances rendering the case moot, whether mootness occurred before 
or after some level of appellate review, a:1d whether the case is "cert\vorthy. " See, e.g., 
Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane); id. a t 709 (Edwards, J.. 
disse nting) (discussing wh ether and under what circumstances decision to vacate judg-
ment is discre tionary and d istinct from findin g of mootness). 
21 Munsingwear, 340 U.S . at 41 (holding r.hat government "slep t on its rights" by fail-
ing to move for vacatur). 
22 !d. at 39 ("The established prac tice of the Court in dealin g with a civil case from 
a court in the federal system which has become moot wh ile on its way he re or pending 
our decision on the merits .is to reverse or vacate the judgment below and remand wi th 
a direc tion to dismiss.") (foomote omitted ). 
23 See Brief for the Uni ted Sta tes as A.micus Curiae Supporti ng Petitioner at 4, Unit-
ed States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), 
cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No. 93-714) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief, Bonner 
Mal[j (arguing that federal courts are "required to gran t a mo tion to vacate the judg-
ment below when a case becomes moot while the process of appellate review is ongo-
ing"). 
24 E.g., Great W. Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92 (1979) (per curiam); see Official 
Transcript of Proceedings before th e Court a t 48 (Oct. 12, 1993), Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo 
Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Ph ilips Corp ., )14 S. Ct. 425 (1993) [hereinafter T ran-
script, Kaisha] (indicating that the Court had not focused on the precise im plica tio ns of 
Mu nsingwear for settled cases) . 
25 See In re Me morial Hosp., 862 F.2d 1299, 1301 (7th Cir. 1988) (fin di ng case set-
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quire vacatur m all those cases,"26 Eduardo argued. 
"Nor does that appear to be what ivl unsingvJear he\d. In a 
subsequent decision, Karcher v. Niay, 27 the Court held that the 
J111unsinowear lan~ruag-e addressed cases that become moot through 
0 u u 
'happenstance' an d distinguished them from cas{:s m which 
mootness is caused by the voluntary actions of the parties."28 
"That distinction makes sense," Eduardo said. "It may be un-
fair to cause a party to be bound by a decision that it is prevented 
from challenging through no fault of its own . But litigants volun-
tarily give up the right to challenge a decision v1hen they settle 
1 • ' • 1 h .r: . . ' 00 'f 1 ' tne case; that s s1mp y t e consequence 01 setuemenr.-~ ;,_ con t 
d . " h . d "1 • . . . un erstand, 1,e contmue , tne contmued uncertamty about vaca-
tur. You referred to a pending Supreme Court case. If Karcher 
clarifies the Ivlunsingwear holding, why is the propriety of vacatur 
still before the Court?" 
"There is indeed a pending case, Bonner ji;Jall, 30 in which the 
Court will be faced with the question of whether J\1unsingwear ap-
plies when a case is settled pending appeal," I responded. "The 
reason for the confusion is that the Nlunsingwear Court did not 
directly consid er the issue of when vacatur is appropriate. 31 In 
Karcher, the Court simply held that vacatur was not com~belled by 
M unsingwear, it d id not conclude whe ther vacatur shou ld be em-
ployed as a discretionary doctrine." 
tled on appeal "neither more nor less moot than it would be if the loser were satisfied 
with the judgment and complied without appealing"). 
26 But see Penguin Books USA Inc. v. Walsh, 929 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1991) (where pre· 
vailing party deliberately took action causing case to become moot prior to appellate 
review, court would vacate district court judgment sua sponte). The court explained: 
"Were it othenvise, appellees could deliberately moot cases on appeal, thereby shielding 
erroneous decisions from reversal." ld. at 73. 
27 484 u.s. 72 (1987). 
28 ld. at 83 (explaining that the "controversy did not become moot due to circum· 
stances unattributable to any of the parties" and therefore "the Munsingwear procedure is 
inapplicable .... "). 
29 Accord Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1439 (1Oth Cir. 1993) 
(" [s] ettlements are, by definition, attributable to the parties and not happenstance"). 
30 United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th 
Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681 ( 1994) (No. 93-714). The case was argued on 
October 4, 1994. See Courts and Procedure: Automatic Vacatur Rule, 63 U .S.L.W. 3279 (Oct. 
11, 1994) (describing oral c.rgument). 
31 ln the oral argument of Bonner Mall, Justice Scc.lia chc.racterized the pending case 
as the first time the Court was considering the issue of vacatur upon settiement in an 
adversary context. See Official Transcript of Proceedings before the Court at 22-25 (Oct. 
4, 1994), United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No. 93-714) [hereinafter Transcript, 
Bonner 1Hall]. 
·~· · 
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"Will the Court be doing that in Bonner lvfalr?" Eduardo asked. 
'"' "b' ., T d "~1 "!-. r . . Jl d . . .t-oss1 !.y,' Jl answere . · ... e vourt ongm a.1y grante cert10ran 
in Bonner Niall to consider a question of bankruptcy 1aw.32 Before 
1 b . f 1 d h ~ ,....., 1 1' • tne case was ne eu or argue to L e ::Supreme a__.ourt, m e litigan ts 
agreed to a settlement and confirmed a cons·~nsuai plan of bank-
. . 3 ~ Th . . · . d . -' ' C . ruptcy o:rgamzanon. - 1e petxtxone r m en. a'- v.1seu tne ourt that 
the case was moot because of the settl ·~men t an d reauested that it 
2 
, ' . . . .b , " , . T' ..., vacat-e tne 1ower court deciSion • aseG on JVitmsmgr..uear. ne • ...... ourt 
responded by asking for briefing and argurnent on the question of 
whether the rule in Munsingwear should be extended to cases that 
become moot due to voluntary se ttlem ent o·.e:nding aooea1."34 
·''-- t_..; Jt.!. 
"So the Court is likely to decide whether vacatur is mandated 
when a case is settled pending appeal," said Ed uardo. 
"Or at least when a case is settled after a gran t of certiora-
ri. 35 T he Court attempted to consider the propriety of routine 
vacatur more broad ly last year in the Kaisha case,"35 I went on, 
"but ultimately dismissed the writ of certiorari on standing 
grounds,37 over the dissent of nvo Justices ,38 without reaching 
32 See United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnersh ip, 2 F.3d 899 
(9th Cir. 1993) , cert. granted, 11 4 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No. 93-714). The Court was to con-
sider the propriety of the new value exception to the absolute p riority rule in bankrupt-
cy. For a description of the litigatio n history in Bonner Mall, see David F. Pike, Stoel Rives 
Attomey to Argue a "Hot" Issue of ?rocedure, WASH . J., Apr. 11, 1994, at l. 
33 Pike, supra note 32. at 1. 
34 See Bonner A•lall, 114 S. Ct. 1367 (1994) (directing parties to brief and argue the 
following question: "Should the rule an nounced in United States v. Munsingwear, 340 
U.S. 36 (1950) , exte nd to cases that become moot in th is Court because of the volunta!)' 
settlement of the parties?"). 
35 See Reply Bri ef of Petitioner at 3, BonneT ii·lail (No. 93-71 4) (arguing that the case 
on ly presen ts the issues of wh ether vacatur is appi'opriate for "certworthy" cases that are 
settled in the Supre me Court). Se ttlemen t of cern,·orthy cases arguzbly presents unique 
policy considera tions because the Supreme Court's grant af certio rari mzy have indicated 
that the lower cou rt decision was worthy of review. ld. at 11; see also Clarke v. United 
States, 915 F. 2d 699, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en bane ) (Edwards , J., dissenting) (distin-
guishing cases that become moot in the Supreme Court because fu rther appellate review 
of those cases is not a matter of right); cf Joint Motio n , Schooiaajt. supra note 8 (re-
questing Supreme Court to grant certiorari fo r the sole purpose of vacatin g the lower 
court decisio ns after case was settled during the pende ncy of pe titions for ce rtiorari). 
36 See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabusbiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp. , 114 S. 
Ct. 425, 426 (1 993) (per curiam) (quoting question pr::sented by Kaisha in petition for 
certiorari as "Should the United States Courts of Appeals routinely vacate d istric t court 
fin al judgments at the parties' request when cases ?.re se ttled wh ile on appeal?"). 
37 Jd. at 428 (dism issing wri t of certiorari as improvidently granted because peti-
tioner was not a party to the appeal below). 
38 justices Stevens and Blackm un dissc:nted from the d ismissal and indicated that 
they considered it appropriate to reach the merits and t.hat, on the merits, they would 
reverse the judgment of the Federal Circuit which had granted the motion to vacate. 
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the Issue of vacatur." 
"One thing that confuses me about vacatur," Edua!"do oh-
served, "is the jurisdiction of the courts. If settlement renders the 
case moot/9 as the litigants argue in Bonner .Niall, there is ilO lon-
ger a case or controversy for .Article III purposes. 10 How then 
does a court have the authority for vacatur, an affirmat.ive judicial 
act beyond ·what is necessary to resolve the ongoing litigation?"·\] 
"It is true that the decision on vacatur appears to be divorced 
from resolution of the particular litigation before the coun..42 In 
a sense, the court is simply arti cula ting the future consequences of 
it~ decision , an action that arguably extends beyond the proper 
role of the judiciary. I think that issue may be broader than vaca-
tur, however, and depend on how you view the structural role of 
the judiciary \vi th respect to lavvTfl.aking generally." 
"Isn't this question analogous to that raised by retroact1v1ty in 
adjudication?" Eduardo asked . "In cases in which a court applies a 
new rule of law prospectively, the court has similarly divorced its 
announcement of rules to govern future cases from the applica-
tion of those rules to the case before it."43 
"I don't see the relationship." 
"It's two sides of the same coin," Eduardo explained. "'When a 
court announces a new rule of law but holds that its ruling will be 
purely prospective, it is announcing a principle for future litigants, 
not for the parties before it. When a court vacates a previous 
judgment, it is announcing that its prior decision will not be the 
law for future litigants, in spite of the fact that it had been ap-
plied to the parties in that case. In both cases, the court's decision 
Kaisha, 114 S. Ct. at 428 (Stevens]. & Blackmun J. , di>senting). 
39 The settlemen t may also present Articl e III standing issues. See infra notes 115-30 
an d accompanying text. 
40 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. l. The Supreme Court first suggested that the doc-
trine of mootness was based on the limi ta tions of Article III in Liner v. J afco, Inc., 375 
U.S. 301, 306 n.3 (1964). See Evan Tsen Lee , Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example 
of 1'-l!ootness, 105 HARV. L. REv. 605 (1992) (tracing and criticizing origins of constitutional 
component of moo tness). 
41 The Cons titution requires the federal courts to dismiss cases that become moot 
during the litigation process. See, e.g., Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 ( 1987) ("Article 
Ill of the Constitution req uires that th ere be a live case or controversy a t the time that 
a federal court decides the case . . .. "). 
42 The issues are separate so long as settlement is not condition ed on vacatur. See 
infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
43 See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S .. 529, 547 ( 199 1) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 548 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (questioning constitutionality of prospective adjudication under Article III). 
' " 
j 
I 
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is concerned exclusively with the future consequences of the rule 
of law rather than the resolution of a pending case." 
"I sup pose that is true," I admitted. "In retroactivity analysis 
the debate seems to be between those who v1e·w the aoproDriate 
1 1 
role o f courts as making the law and those, like J ustice Scalia, who 
argue that courts should 'find' the law." 
"The characterization of judges as 'discovering' the law is 
ll ., , "l B' k "44 l<d ' . ' " T actua. y attn outab. e to lac 'Stone, L uarao pom tea o u t. JUS-
tice Scalia doesn' t go quite that far. He is simp ly awuino-
0 
for a 
u '· ) i_j 
greate r fideli ty by the courts to textual analysis by calling for 
j udges to decide cases as though they were fi nd ing the law. '145 
""N ~ 1 • . 11 ' " I . . ., " . t'_" P 1 o n etrH:.ess your pomt IS we taKen, sa1d . · Garrymg ,._ 
anaiogy through, by 1equesting vacatur, the li tigants are asking a 
court to 'lose' the law it has previously 'found. "146 
"Put in those terms, vacatur seems like a type of preced ential 
h ide and seek," Eduardo observed. "Allowing routine vacatur also 
seems inconsistent with the broader structure of adj udica tive law-
making." 
"T hat concern is more properly addressed to the propriety of 
routine vacatur than to th e courts' power to vacate. Vacatur does 
raise a number of interesting policy issues." 
"vVith respect to the courts' power, I suppose the Article III 
issue can be avoided," Eduardo mused, "by litigants -vvi.th a little 
foresight. If the parties incorporated vacatur into the terms of the 
settlement agreemen t or conditioned settlement upon vacatur, the 
case would not be moot, and the court \vould be compelled to 
resolve the motion." 
"That's exactly what the litigants d id in Nest le Co. v. Chester's 
Market, Inc. ,~ 7 the leading Second Circuit decision on the propri-
44 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTO NE, COMMENTARIES ON THE L-\WS OF E0.'GL-\N D 69 (15th 
ed. 1809) (expounding deciara tory theory of adjudication). Although the view that judges 
discover ra ther than crea te th e law is ge nerally a ttributed to Blackstone, a sim ilar view 
was expressed by Sir Matthew Hale 13 years before Blackstone was born . See Linkle tte r v. 
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 623 n.7 (1965) (citing GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 
206 (1st ed. 1909)) . 
45 James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia; J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
46 See Brief of Respondent at 36, United States Bancorp Mo rtgage Co. v. Bon ner 
Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 1993), em. gran ted, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994) (No . 93-
714) [hereinafter Res pondent's Brief, Bonner Mall] (characterizing request for vacatur as 
"asking this Court to take the law that the Ninth Circuit has 'found' and, th rough vaca-
tur, to 'lose ' that law so it may be fo und another day"). 
47 756 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1985) . 
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ety of postsettlement vacatur. The court in Nestle agreed that the 
case was not moot and reached its decision by balancing the poli-
cies implicated by the motion. Because so many settlements explic-
itly address the issue of vacatur," I added, "it's possible that the 
Supreme Court will move beyond the !Vlunsingwear question and 
address at least some of the policy considerations of postsettlement 
vacatur." 
HI. SETTLEMENT TOOL OR BA_,~GAINING C HIP? EDUARDO DEBiUES 
THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS BEHIND ROUTINE VACATUR 
"If vacatur is discretionar;', the question is whether 
Munsingwear should be extended to cases that are settled pending 
appeal. Alternatively, what standard should the cour ts apply in 
ruling on a motion to vacate?" I said. "This is the subject that has 
generated the broadest disagreement among the lower courts."48 
"Why is there so much disagreement?" Eduardo asked. 
"Primarily because the courts differ on the policy reasons for 
and against routine vacatur," I suggested. 
"Let's talk about the policy arguments. I understand why a 
litigant would seek vacatur-to erase the preclusive or precedential 
effect of a decision with which the litigant disagrees. But why do 
courts condone this manipulation?" Eduardo asked. 
"There are several reasons why courts allow vacatur when a 
case is settled pending appeal. Possibly the dominant rationale is 
that vacatur is seen as encouraging settlement. This is th e argu-
ment espoused by the Second Circuit, which would be ruling on a 
motion to vacate in your case."49 
"vVhat do you mean? How can vacatur encourage settlement?" 
"A number of circuit courts, like the Second Circuit, maintain 
extensive settlement programs at the appellate level. 50 T hese pro-
48 See Fisch, Rewriting Hist01)', supra note 5, at 602-06 (describing varying approaches 
to motions to vacate taken by the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); see also 
Clarendon, Ltd. v. Nu-West Indus., Inc., 936 F.2d !27 (3d Cir. 1991) (adopting general 
policy against vacatur when case is settled pending appeal); In re United States, 927 F.2d 
626 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same); Federal Data Corp. v. SMS Data Prods. Group, Inc., 819 
F.2d 277 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (favoring routine vacatur). 
49 The motion to vacate when a case is settled after final judgment can be made ei-
ther to the district court that rendered the decision or to the circuit court once an ap-
peal has been filed. Fisch, Rewriting HistOI)', supra note 5, at 596-98. 
50 See id. at 590 n.6 (describing programs used by circuit courts to encourage settle-
ment pending appeal); Judith Resnik, V\7hose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Set-
tlement, and the Rnle of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
1471, 1501-04 (1994) [hereinafter Resnik, Whose Judgment?] (describing development of 
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grams are consistent with a strong policy of encouraging voluntary 
se ttlement to conserve public and judicial resources .51 Obviously 
one impediment to settlement on appeal is the adverse conse-
quences of the lower court decision for the losing party. If the 
vitality of the decision can be negotiated away as part of the settle-
ment process, it will be easier to persuade the losing party to give 
up its right to appeal." 
"The losing litigant buys off its adversary in exchange for 
free dom from any collateral consequences of the decision'?" asked 
Eduardo. 
"That's right," I said. "Several circuits have adopted a policy of 
expressly allowing vacatur as part of the settlement process in 
order to encourage the settlement of cases pending appeal. " 
"Isn't encouraging settlement at the appellate level really a 
false economy?" Eduardo questioned. "If the litigants know they 
can routinely escape the adverse consequences of a trial court 
decision through post-trial settlement and vacatur, the stakes of 
going to trial are lower. I would think this would encourage liti-
gants to go to trial more often." 
"I've made precisely that argument myself," I agreed.52 "By 
permitting vacatur, courts are making the risk of a trial less costly, 
thereby reducing the incentive for early settlement. A recent study 
of settlement rates in California lends support to this view. Profes-
sor Stephen Barnett studied settlement rates in the California 
appellate courts and found that cases settled twice as often in the 
one appellate division that refused to grant motions to vacate 
when cases were settled after trial. "53 
"And because the largest litigation expenses occur at the pre-
trial and trial stages, the delay in settlement until after trial is ex-
tremely costly,"54 Eduardo observed. "So the rationale that vacatur 
appellate settlement programs in response to judicial policy of encouraging settlement). 
51 See generally Stephen MeG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary 
System, 44 HASTINGS LJ. l (1992) (describing how the general U.S. policy in favor of set-
tlement has been expanded by various procedural innovations). 
52 See Fisch, Rewriting History, supra note 5, at 635-38 (using economic analysis to 
argue that availability of routine vacatur encourages litigants to delay settlement). 
53 Stephen R. Barnett, lv1aking Decisions Disappear: Depublication and Stipulated Reversal 
in the California Supreme Cow1, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. l 033 ( 1993). 
54 This consumption of resources occurs to a substantial, albeit lesser, extent when a 
case is resolved by a motion for summary judgment. Current litigation practices typically 
involve the resolution of the majority of factual issues through pretrial procedures such 
as discovery. To the extent that the litigants complete discovery and resolve the case 
through a motion for summary judgment, that judgment is the result of substantial com-
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conserves judicial resources doesn't make sense as a reason to al-
low vacatur."55 
"Well, deference to the request of the litigants, when they 
se ttle a case and request vacatur, can he read more broadly than a 
desire to conserve judicial resources," I said . "Vacatur is also con-
sistent with the view of litigation as a process driven by private 
parties for the resolution of private disputes. By d enying a request 
to vacate in a case in which se ttlement is cond itioned on vacatur, 
a court is, in a sense, forcing the litigants to continue the litiga-
tion against their wills. "56 
"I understand that litigation was tradi tionally conceptualized as 
a private d ispute resolution mechanism, but hasn't modern juris-
prudence evolved toward a more public law model? If you look at 
cases like Brown v. Board of Education57 or Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey,58 the point of the litigation is to develop and enforce social 
norms, not to resolve the dispute in an isolated transaction." 
"That certainly is one strand in the development of modern 
civil litigation," I acknowledged, "and I think it extends beyond so-
called 'public interest' litigation. Even classically private areas of 
law such as tort and contract li tigation are now being viewed as 
furthering societal goals. Toxic tort cases like asbestos litigation 
alter societal safety and cleanup standards,59 for example, and 
mitment of resources as well. Moreover, a case may result in the creation of multiple 
trial opinions and even appellate opinions prior w the completion of a trial. 
55 See Benavides v. Jackson Nat' ! Life Ins. Co., 820 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (D. Colo. 
1993) (The experience of "this and other distric t courts" demonstrates "that vacatur saves 
far less in circuit court resources than, by its perverse incentive for litigants to stall on 
settlement until after judgment, it costs th e district courts and the parties."). 
56 See Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt. , Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Ci r. 1985) (refusing 
to deny vacatur on the basis that it would force iitigants to continue li tigation they were 
willing to settle). There is support in other contexts for a court 's power to review and 
reject a settlement agreement as unfair. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1 (providing for court 
approval of settlement of shareholder derivative litigation); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9019 (pro-
\-iding for judicial review of settlement of claims by and against bankruptcy estates); Ev-
ans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 727 & n.13 (1986) (discussing judicial authority to authorize 
class action settlements). Moreover, the courts have consistently imposed !imitations on 
litigants' ability to control their jurisdiction through stipulation. See, e.g. , Dannenberg v. 
Sofnvare Toolworks Inc., 16 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing appeal where litigants 
attempted, by stipulation , to convert order of partial summary judgment into final appeal-
able order). 
57 347 U.S 483 (1954) (The Supreme Court later addressed the remedial issue in 
Brown \'. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955)). 
58 11 2 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
59 See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE 
COURTS 268-76 (1986) (explaining and distinguishing between public and private law 
approaches to toxic tort litigation); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Judicial P.elief and Public Tort 
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products liability suits encourage manufac turers and sellers to 
provide safer products .60 One commentator has even argued that 
the development of publ ic values through litigation justifies free-
ing courts from the traditional case or controversy limitations on 
their jurisdiction. "5 1 
"That seems like an extreme position," Eduardo observed. 
"It also reflects only one side of the public law/private law 
debate .62 There 's an equaily compelling argu ment that courts are, 
and should be, increasingly focusing on how to facilitate dispute 
resolution. T he appellate settlernent programs I mentioned earlier 
are simply one example of this trend. Look at the growth in alter-
native d ispute resolution ("A,_f)R") procedures such as arbitra tion 
and mediation and the courts' reaction to those processes.63 
Courts are not sim ply deferring to litigants ' desire to use these 
tools, they are actively encouraging and in some cases m anda ting 
ADR. 64 In a recent case, a court tried to force the parties to un-
dergo a nonbinding summary jury trial as a m eans of inducing 
settlement. "65 
"I suppose the increasingly litigious nature of U.S. society and 
the scarcity of judicial resources encourage that outlook," Eduardo 
said. "It's hard to understand why courts would accept a role pure-
ly as arbiters of private disputes. That characterization would seem 
Law, 92 YALE LJ. 749 (1983). 
60 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus. Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholarship, 21 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 647, 671 ( 1 988) (explaining that th e development of new theories of tort liabili-
ty alters the behavior of provide rs of goods and serdces). 
61 Lee, supra note 40 (arguing that the "public values" model of litigation justifies 
removing constitutional perspec tive from mootn ess and recas ting the doctrine as purely 
prudential). 
62 See id. at 62&-28 (explaining and contrasting "dispute resolution" model and "pub-
lic values" model of litigation). For a discussion of the public law model of litigation , see 
generally Abraham Chayes, The ,'?.n/e of the judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 H . .>JW. L. REv. 
1281 (1976) and Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Tenn Fon:ward: The Fonns of justice, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (] 979) . 
63 See, e.g., Raymond ]. Broderick, Yes to Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR, 18 LITIG. 3 
(1992) (describing development and use of court-annexed ADR programs). 
64 Congress recently j oined in the effort by enacting th e Civil J ustice Reform Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
28 U.S.C.), which requires each of the federal district courts to develop plans to promote 
the reduction of "expense and delay" in civil litigation. 
65 Strandell v. Jackson Coun::y, 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Ill. 1987) (setting forth ra tio-
nale behind order compelli ng summa!)' juT)' tria l and hold ing attorney in criminal con-
tempt for refusing to participa te). The Seven th Circu it vacated the judgment of con-
te mpt, holding that FED. R. CN. P. 16 did not pe rmit courts to compel the parties to 
participate in summary jury trials. Strandell 1' . Jackscn Coun ty, 838 F.2d 884, 888 (7 th 
Cir. 1988). 
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to diminish the prestige and importance of the judicial role. 1 
would think courts would be anxious to preserve the role of the 
courts as lawmakers." 
"In a way, arbitration and other forms of ADR do p reserve 
that roie, by separating the d ispute resolution process from the 
traditional triaL The problem is that it tends to leave the courts 
operating primarily as case managers."66 
"But the emphasis on ADR should also increase the signifi-
cance of cases that go to trial," Eduardo countered. "Xf th e courts 
are wal'; of allowing the consumption of resources invo lved in a 
fu ll trial on the merits, they should be more interested in p reserv-
mg the results of that trial." 
"It does seem counterintuitive for a court that wants to dis-
courage the litigant-; from going to trial to allow them to erase 
the resul t of the trial so easily." 
"Preserving the judgment presumably has value in obviating 
the need for future litigation by others," Eduardo continued. 
"Absolutely," I agreed. "The doctrines of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel are designed to preserve judicial resources by 
preventing relitigation of issues that had been thoroughly aired in 
a prior proceeding.67 Eliminating the preclusive effect of the 
judgment is one of the primary reasons for seeking vacatur. 68 
"How important is the potential for preclusion in a court's 
determination as to whether vacatur is appropriate?" Eduardo asked. 
"It depends on the circuit," I answered. "The Federal Circuit 
66 See generaily Robert Peckham, The Federal judge as Case i'v!anager: The New Role in 
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL L. REv. 770 (1 981) ; Judith Resnik, Mana-
gerial Judges, 96 H.-\RV. L. REV. 374 (1982). 
67 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 ( 1979); Blonder-Tongue 
Lab. , Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) . T he doctri nes of preclusion 
also preserve fin ality. !d. ; see also Munsingwear, 340 U.S. at 38 (stressing need for· doctrine 
of res jud icata to provide "terminal points for litiga tion") . The Court has continued to 
reaffirm these values. See, e.g., Cardinal Chern. Co. v. Morton Int"l Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967 
(1993) (public values in resolution of patent validity justify preseiV<~tion of judgment after 
subseque nt finding of non infringement) . 
68 See, e.g., William D. Zeller, Avoiding Issue Preclusion by Settlement Conditioned upon the 
Vacatur of Entered judgmm ts, 96 YALE L.J. 860 (1987) . The plaintiff in Kaisha sought vaca-
tur for the very purpose of avoiding preclusio n based on a jury trial in the Southern 
District of Florida. At th e time of the Supreme Court argument, a second tribunal, the 
Northern District of Illinois, had relied on the Florida judgment to bar re litigation of 
various issues; the Illinois court then re instated the claims when the Federal Circuit vaca t-
ed the Florida judgment. Kaisha, ll4 S. Ct. at 429 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Brief 
fo r Respondent at 2-7, Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaish a v. Un ited States Philips 
Corp .. 114 S. Ct. 425 (1993) (No. 92-1123) (describing the history of litigation in Flo rida 
and Illinois). 
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granted the motion to vacate in Kaisha over the d irect objection 
of the third parry litigant who sought to rely on the judgment.69 
O ther courts vvill consider the existence of third parties who will 
benefit fro m the judgment or future litigation that can be avoided 
through preclusion doctrines in the vacatur decision. The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, has enunciated a balancing test under which 
the interests of third parties in the preclusive effect of the judg-
ment is one relevant factor." 70 
"Should the courts' approach to motions to vacate reaily be 
determined by concern about preclusion?" Eduardo asked . "I 
mean, couldn ' t courts just continue to rely on vacated decisions 
for preclusive cffect?" 71 
"In fact, a few courts have done so,"72 I said. "Under current 
practice, hmvever, that approach is dangerous. After all, the vaca-
tu r decision may be based on factors other than the settlement, 
such as a defect in the underlying d ecision. 73 Current methods of 
59 See United States Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 971 F.2d 728, 73()..31 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (denying .Kaisha's motion to intervene and granting motion to vacate Florida 
judgment despite its preclusive effec t). 
70 See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 769 (9th Cir. 
1989) (denying motion to vacate because of utili ty of judgment in actions pe nding 
against several o th er parties arising out of same transaction) ; Rings by Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
Western Conference of Tea msters , 636 F.2d 720, 721 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982) (applying bal-
ancing test and denyin g vacatur because trial court's findings had already been given 
collateral estoppel effec t in a second action). 
71 The general rule is that vacated decisions have no preclusive effect for either res 
judicata or collateral estoppel purposes. See Michael W. Loudenslager, Note, Erasing the 
Law: The Implications of Settlements Conditioned Upon Vacatur or Reversal of judgments, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1229, 1247 n.158 (1993) (citing cases); see also Plaintiffs' Responsive 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment upon Magis-
trate J udge's Reconsideration Thereof at 10-13, Levan v. Capi tal Cities/ ABC, In c. (S .D. 
Fla.) (No. 92-0325-CIV-ATKINS) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Responsive Memorandum, Levan] 
(arguing that cases vacated due to settlement have no preclusive effect). 
72 See, e.g., Bates v. Unio n Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding applica-
tion of collateral estoppel effect to vacated judgment in Amos v. Union Oil Co., 663 F. 
Supp. 1027 (D. Or. 1987), where record revealed that vacatin g judge had not considered 
the effect of vacatur on judgment's preclusive effect); Chemetron Corp. v. Business 
Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1187 (5th Cir. 1982) (giving collateral estoppel effect to trial 
court findings resulting from two month bench trial that had bee n vacated as a result of 
settlement, in Cosmos Bank v. Bintliff, No. 67-H-590 (S.D . Tex. 1975)). The Fifth Circui t 
later stated tha t Chemetron has no precedential force. H ughes v. San ta Fe Int'l Corp. , 847 
F.2d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 1988); see also Fisch, Rewriting History, supra note 5, at 618-20 (dis-
cussing problems with Chemetron approach and noting th e reasons why it has no t been 
widely followed). 
73 Moreover, the parties ' decision to settle may have been influenced by their per-
ception that the judgment wc.s defective. See infra notes 14()..47 and accompanying text 
(discussing settlement as a response to an aberrational judgment) . 
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reporting frequently do not distinguish cases vacated solely as a 
result of settlement from cases vacated on other grounds. Thus, a 
court should reasonably be wary of concluding when a case has 
been vacated that it nonetheless offe red the losing litigant a 'full 
and fai r opportunity to litigate. "'74 
"I can see the problem with having a court re ly on a decision 
that isn't really good law or on erroneous findings o f fact," 
Eduardo acknowledged. "But this could be addressed by changing 
our methods of reporting subsequent case h istory to indicate when 
a case is vacated as a result of mootness o r settlement/5 thereby 
iden tifying when reliance by a subsequent court is justified.''76 
"Even that identification process migh t prove unreliable ," I 
suggested. "To what extent should a court indicate, in a d ecision 
to vacate, its reservations about the validi ty of the original judg-
men t? Does a failure to record such reservations demonstrate a 
willingness for the verdict to have preclusive dfect?" 
"Presumably many cases that are settled pending appeal pres-
ent legitimate appealable issues," Eduardo observed. 
"But should the availability of a nonfrivolous appeal deprive 
the verdict of validity if the appeal process is not completed?" I 
asked .77 
"I suppose it depends upon the extent to which the verdict 1s 
defective." 
"But how do we assess that?" I pressed.78 "For example, a 
court in Florida recently vacated a jury verdict in a securities fraud 
class action suit. Although vacatur was based on a settlement 
74 Parkiane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332 (1979) (internal quotations 
omiued). 
75 See Letter from Richard A. Givens to Matthew Cheney, Shepard's/McGraw Hill 
(Jan. 26, 1994) (on file with author) (suggesting Shepard's adopt a case history symbol 
indicating when a case has been vacated due to se ttlem ent) . 
76 Courts have been known to take precisely the opposite approach. Fo r example , 
the vacatur order in Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 621 F. Supp. 
685 (S.D.N .Y. 1981), slates that the court was vacating its judgment so H artford could 
submit additional affidavits regarding Bankers Trust 's motion for summary judgment. !d. 
In fact, the parties had settled the litigation with the understandin g that the trial court 
would vacate its judgment based on the settlemen t. See infra notes 124-25 and accompany-
ing text (desc;-ibing Bankers Tmst litiga tio n ) . 
77 See Transcript, Bonner Mall, supra note 31, at 14 (counsel for U.S. Banco r-p argu-
ing tha t, so long as court of appeals has not completed its review, decision of lower 
court is not fin al) ; id. at 28 (argument by Soli citor General that Supreme Court's grant 
of certio rari rende rs court of appeals' decision "te ntative") . 
78 The Solicitor General urged the Supreme Court to adopt a procedure of partia l 
review in settled cases, in which it would determine if the matter were certworthy and, if 
so, vacate without granting full review. See id. a t 19. 
. j 
'I 
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agreement, the court expiicitly stated in granting the motion to 
vacate that the j ury verdict 'didn 't comply 't,ith any of the 
evidence' 79 and that the defendants had reasonable grounds fo r 
appeal.80 Should those statements prevent a subsequent court 
fro m giving the verdict preclusive effect?" 
"It sounds as if there was a probiem with the jury verdict," 
Eduardo said. 
"Possibly. On the othe r hand, notwithstanding its articluated 
reservations about the verdict, the court had previously refused to 
grant a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 81 Al-
though the court may have believed the verdict was defective, it 
may also have been inf1uenced by the p3rties' express desire to 
prevent the verdict from being used in a re lated pending case. 82 
If preclusion depends on how vaca tur is labeled or whether it 
appears to result from a defective judgment, savvy litigants are 
going to attem pt to control the record." 
"And I suppose the same factors that lead courts like the 
Second Circuit to grant initial requests for vacatur would cause 
them to defer to litigants ' requests regarding the subsequent desig-
nation of the case,"83 Eduardo admitted. "In that case, a new la-
79 Transcript of Hearing a t 13 (May ll , 1993), Purce ll v. Bankatlantic Fin . Corp. 
(S.D. Fla.) (Nos. 89-1284, 89-1 605, 89-1850) . 
80 The court also issued a final judgment of vacatur in which it stated that it had 
"serious reservations about the award and ... the legal m lin gs upon which it is based." 
Final Judgment Approving Settlement and Order of Dismissal at 4, PurcelL 
81 See Order on Plaintiffs' Mo tion to Ainend Judgment to Add Prejudgment Interes t 
at 4, Purcell. ("This Court cannot say that the jury's verdict was irrational or without 
factual and evidentiary found ation , and has accordingly de nied Defendants' motions for 
judgment as a matter of law and in the alternative for a new trial in prior orders."). 
82 At the time the Purcell litigation was settled, the parti es were aware that the 
Purcell verdict might have p reclusive effec t in Levan v. Capital Cities/ ABC, Inc. (S.D. Fla.) 
(No. 92-325-CIV-ATKINS) . The Purcell settlement agree ment was conditioned on the court 
both vacating the judgment and jury verdict in thei r entirety and "decrce [ing] that such 
verdict and judgment shall have no res judicata, colla te ral estoppe l, or any preclusive 
effect whatsoever . ... " Stipulation of Settlement at 20, Purcell. 
83 An example of this deference can be found in the recent settlement of securities 
fruad litigation involving Miniscribe. As pan of a post-trial settlement of a lawsuit involv-
ing several m~or defendants in the litigation, the court agreed to sign decisions indicat-
ing that the prior jury verd icts were "not supported by sufficient evidence" and "contrary 
to the great weight and preponderance of evidence." Andrew Pollack, Big Defendants Settle 
in Miniscribe Lawsuit, N.Y. TlMES, Feb. l 9, 1992, at D4. According to Pollack's article, the 
judge indicated in an interview that he had acted solely out of a desire to facilitate the 
settlement. '" I did strike the jury verd ict down but only as a result of the settlement, not 
as an independe nt decision that the j ury verdict was bad or anything."' !d. Notably, at 
the time of the settlemen t, there were several pend ing lawsuits based on the same 
transactions, including a shareholder suit and an action by the Securi ties and Exchange 
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beling method wouldn't solve anything. lV1oreover, if 'Ne allow 
courts to rely on vacated decisions, aren't we depriving the liti-
gants of th e benefit of their bargain? "'{ou j us t said tha t removing 
the preclusive effec t of a decision was a substantial factor m many 
:r·"' nu·"' n:- ~ fo~ -,::~ ratll -r " 'L- li ........ ~~ - 1 ~ ....... __ ~1. 
" "'1 ' r • · · • " " • d "Tf 1 C .. .i. na t s a ra1r pomt, 1 sa1 . _ a court lS gomg to o.e1er to 
the litigants by granting vacatur, it hardly seems appropriate to 
take b <:.ck part of the value of the settlement by allowing the j udg-
men t to continue to have co11ateral cffects. 8'i .A...nd if the Second 
Circuit is correct in belleving that vacatur encou:rages se ttlement, a 
vacatur with reduced consequences vvill he less ·effective in achiev-
ing th a t objective , by making vacatur less of a 'bargain ing 
ch ip.'"85 
"It would be even worse if reliance on vacated d ecisions var-
ied from case to case," Eduardo warned. "'With a uniform rule, 
parties could assess the value of vacatur as part of the se ttlement 
negotiation. How is a litigant to decide whether a settlement ad-
dresses problems such as the collateral consequences of the judg-
ment, if the litigant cannot determine what those collateral conse-
;l" quences are. 
"You're right. Inconsistent use of vacated decisions would 
inject additional uncertainty into the se ttlement process. Since 
uncertainty is already the most significant barrier to settlement,86 
courts would be making settlement more difficult and defeating 
the rationale for permitting vacatur." 
"I suppose if reliance on vacated opinions became sufficiently 
widespread , vacatur would have little value to litigants considering 
settlemen t after trial. This just takes us back to the in itial question 
Commission. ld. 
84 See, e.g. , United States v. Phillips, No. 922-6064, 1993 U.S. App . LEXIS 4643, at *6 
n.2 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 1993) ("The very purpose of vacating the district court's o rder is to 
insure that no collateral consequences flow from an order which has escaped appellate 
review on the merits.''). 
85 Man ufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas, 11 F.3d 381, 335 (2d Cir. 1993) 
(quoting In re Memorial Hosp. v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Ser:s., 862 
F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
86 See Fisch , Reuniting History, supra note 5, at 634-35 (describing importance of infor-
mation about the value of case and likelihood of success in allowing parties to reach 
settlemen t agreement); Robert H . Mnookin & Louis Korn hauser, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Law: The Case of DivoTce, 88 YALE LJ. 950 ( 1979) ( outcornes of se ttled cases are a 
function of the parties' expectancies conce rning the ou tcom e at trial); Steven Shavell & 
Louis Kaplow, Legal Advice About Information to Present in Litigation: Its Effects and Social 
Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 565, 594 (1989) (analyzing role of information about con-
sequences of litigation in settlement process) . 
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about whether or not vacatur is desirable." 
"\Nell , remember that the value of a j udicial decision is not 
limited to preclusion," I said. "A judgment is a precedent, and the 
effect of a precedent extends beyond a particular d ispute. Vacatur 
destroys that precedential value as weil. 87 Of course, most re-
quests are for vacatur of trial court decisions83 which., although 
I h 1 • ·" t:: r 1' ' l . "89 tney may ave prec us1ve e!lect, are or lttle va ue as pr·ccedent. 
"Presumably, the value of encouraging settlement diminishes 
once a case has generated not merely a trial level but also an 
appellate decision ," Eduardo observed. "I don't thirrk you're right 
to dismiss the import:mce of trial court decisions though. Is it 
really true that these decisions are not valid as preced ent? T hey're 
cited aH the time."90 
87 Most courts have assumed \vithout detailed analysis that vacatur eliminates the 
precedential effect of a decision. See, e.g., Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabush iki Kaisha v. Unit· 
ed States Philips Corp. , 114 S. Ct. 425, 43 1 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing 
routine vacatur as objectionable because judicial precedents are presumptively cotTect and 
valuable and should not be eliminated at the parties' request); Manufacturers Hanover 
Trust Co., 11 F.3d at 384 (refusing to allow vacatur of appellate court judgment where it 
would allow "a party \vith a deep pocket to eliminate an unreviewable precedent it dis· 
likes"); In re Memorial Hosp. of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(vacatur would improperly tum a precedent into the parties' property); Loudenslager, 
supra note 71, at 1242-43 nn.l32-35 (citing cases). 
The government has also argued that vacatur renders a decision of no precedential 
effect. See Transcript, Kaisha, supra note 24, at 45 . But see id. at 36--40 (debate during oral 
argument in which effect of vacated opinion was described variously ranging from per· 
suasive authority, the equivalent of a law review article, to binding on the same distric t 
court under principles of stare decisis, to constituting the law of the circuit and binding 
precedent). The effect of vacatur upon the precedential effect of a decision was a prima· 
ry subject of questioning during the Bonner Mall argument. See, e.g., Tr2nscript, Bonner 
Mall, supra note 31, at 4-7, 21, 26-28 . 
88 The distinction in precedential value between trial and appellate court decisions 
could justifY application of a different standard to reques ts to vacate appellate court judg-
ments. See Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., ll F.3d at 385 (distinguishing between trial 
and appellate decisions and holding that, with respect to appellate decisions, the public 
interest in preserving precedent takes precedence over the interest in encouraging settle· 
ment). It would also be possible to distinguish cases that become moot in the U.S. Su-
pre me Court due to settlement from other appellate decis ions. See supra note 35 (de· 
scribing effort of petitioner in United States Banco1p to distinguish "certworthy" cases). 
89 See, e.g., In re Smith , 964 F.2d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 1992) (district court decisions 
have no precedential effect); Lee, supra note 40, at 668 n.360 (stating although there is 
some authority that, in the absence of higher authority. district courts should follow the 
decisions of other district courts within the same state, the weight of authority is to the 
con trary) ; Brief for the United States as Am icus Curio.e Supporting Respondents at 25-26, 
Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp. , 11 4 S. Ct. 425 
(1993) (No. 92-1123) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief, Kaisha] (characterizing precedential 
value of district court decisions as "debatable"). 
90 Furthermore, many issues such as discovery disputes and other collateral orders 
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"A case may be cited for its persuasive or informational value 
without being a binding precedent," I said . "Vlitness the fact that 
lower court decisions are cited to the courts of appeals and the 
Supreme Coun . Clearly those decisions aren't cited because they 
-ere b; ........ ~ ·i ·"C' ...., r..,.;.-·o Y"l-:-.tr '' 91 d.t .<HI_Ll. LO r.;\ ._.Ui l -lj . 
"Does a decision have to be binding upon a cou rt to cons ti-
tute a p recedent?" Eduardo wondered. "I suppose I'm asking how 
you define precedent before you discount the value of these dis-
trict COl!ft ODii1iOrls."92 
l 
'T ve always considered a precedent to be a prior decision that 
the court d.eciding a particuiar case must follmv; so, yes, I would 
think a decision must be binding upon the court to be a prece-
dent."93 
~ 'Bt-tt surely tt1e issue of how bindi11g is a rnat.ter of degree, 
h . h ., - . -Fi . . "11 . " ~d l . r1 "UT w 1c stl1i makes any de~mltlon 1 uslVe, .t · uarco pers1steu. v. e 
know, for instance, that lower courts routinely seek to distinguish 
precedents that they do not want to follow. 94 Because subsequent 
cases are rarely identical, the degree to which a precedent will be 
binding is limited only by the creativity of the decisionmaker.95 
Moreover the Supreme Court continues to vacillate on the degree 
are rarely the subject of appellate decisions. See, e.g., Thomas J. Dougherty, 'Fraud on the 
lvlarket' Securities Class Action Certification Decisions, INSIGHTS, Apr. 1994, at 20 (describing 
fact that although securities class action certification decisions have substantiai impact, 
they are rarely subject to appellate review). On these topics, district court decisions form 
the e ntire corpus of decisional law. 
91 Indeed, in its recent decision in Central Bank of Denver v. Firs t Inters tate, 114 S. 
Ct. J.139 ( 1994), the Supreme Court overruled decisions by all e!eYen federal courts of 
appeals that had recognized aiding and abetting liability under § !O(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. See John F. Olson et al., The End of the Section JO(b) Aiding and 
Abetting Liability Fiction, l NSlGHTS, Jur~e 1994, at 8 n .7 (citing circuit court decisions). 
92 Any attempt to define precedent must include an examination of the values that 
are promoted by judicia! adheren ce to precedent, such as finality, coherence, fairness, 
predictabiliry and et1iciency. See Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Con stitu tional A.djudi-
calion, 88 COUJM. L. REv. 723, 748 (1988) (describing justificatio ns fo r a system of adher-
ence to precedent). A full treatment of this subject is beyond the scope of this article. 
93 See Evan H. Caminker, H7!)' lviust Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 
STAN. L. REv. 817, 818 (1994) (" longstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always 
bo und to follow a precedent established by a court 'superior ' to it"); Monaghan, supra 
r~ote 92, at 754-55 (arguing that , in some sense , a precedent must be binding upo n a 
subsequent court, but concluding that "binding authority" is a social construct without 
sorrte "im1T1utable essence []'' and that th e exten t to which a precedent is binding de-
pends to a large extent on the rcle of s:.are decisis). 
94 CJ Michael j. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitu tion al Decisiomnaking and 
Theory, 60 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 68, 106-09 (1991) (describing abili ry of Supreme Court to 
weake n its own precedents through distinctions) . 
95 See Monaghan, supra note 92 , at 765-67 (discussing degree to which courts can 
distinguish precedents to avoid them ). 
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to which its pnor decisions can be overruied.96 !f. as Justice Mar-
shall has warned, the Court is reducing its fideli ty to established 
precedents,97 it would seem to be inviting lovver courts and legis-
latures to continne to challenge them." 
H A l C A. h 1 .. ,.... J 1 
11.. rmmoer or recent sc o1ars nave gone even turtner ana 
- d .J t . £ . t ' 1 ' ' . ' suggesu:· mac m1enor cour:..S nave no ega.t GUt)' v.;natsoever to 
obey h ierarchical precedent,"98 I acknov!ledged, "although I th ink 
this is a fa irly radical proposition ." 
"1 arr--ep "o.o~kinp- of -~diral can 1i trouble ·
1
vou. for ITlOf·P CJI, .. - ol ·~· ui ~a. ·"•o !Cl ...... , - ~ ~ 
that excellent coffee?" Eduardo asked. 
" " • ' f' C '- ' "1;,171-. • ' • • f lt 1s a goo o. co~tee macmne. v ~ 11cn v.;e cleoded to get a co·-
fee machine, we had 30 many debates about -..vho would clean it 
h 1 d ~ . l , . h .. ...1 ' • 1 ' l . t .at we .10. ..< tO nno a macmne t oat d1un t reqmre Cl<H y mamte-
nann:. The unexpected benefit was that this machine brews each 
cu o of coffee on request and to ind ividual specifications. " 
1 • L 
"I like my coffee strong and high-test. I'm afraid I share my 
brother's addiction to caffeine."99 Cup in hand, Eduardo contin-
ued. "In addition to questions over the extent to which a prece-
dent is binding, I think there's a fair amount of debate over what 
aspect of a decision constitutes precedent. Does the precedent 
consist of the decision, the rules formulated by the decisionmaker, 
and/ or the reasons for those rules?" 100 
''I'm afraid the coffee break threw me off," I said. "\Vhy are 
we debating the meaning of precedent?" 
''I'm trying to understand the effect of vacatur on precedent," 
Eduardo exolained, "and I'm havina-
0
. trouble 'IVith your character-
1 ' 
ization of vacatur as destroying the precedential value of a deci-
sion. Unlike preclusion, where a decision either is or is not bind-
96 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Payne v. Tennes-
see, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). 
97 Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619, 2623 n.2 (Marshali, J. , dissenting) (describing a variety 
of Supreme Court decis ions as "endangered precedents"). 
98 See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 93, at 820-21 (desc iibing recent academi c ch alleng-
es to the doctrine of hierarchical precedem); Gary Lawson, The Constituiional Case Against 
Precedent, 17 HARV. JL. & PUB. POL'>' 23 ( 1994) (claiming that fidelity to the Constitution 
is more important than fidelity to precedent); lV!ichael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: 
Some Variations on the Themes of Robert M. Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 33, 85 
(1990) (arguing that it is nei ther insubordinate nor improper for a !ower court to repu-
dia te the precedent of a higher court). 
99 See Delgado, lwdrigo 's Eighth Chronicle, supra n ote ! , at 524 (describing Rodrigo 's 
lol'e of coffee). 
100 See Monaghan, supra note 92, at 763-57 (describing th e problem of defining pre-
cedent and the implications of diffei·ent approaches). 
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ing, precedent strikes me as a more flexible concept. This leads 
me to conclude that vacated decisions can still have a role in the 
development of the lmv through precedent. " 
"That goes back to my point that decisions have informational 
value as weli as precedential value ," I said. "The many published 
volumes of the Federal Supplement bear testimony to the importance 
of'judicial decisions beyond their role as precedent. The market 
demonstrated by LEXIS and vVESTLA W for unreported and un-
published decisions, many of which expressly lack preceden tial 
value, 10 1 orovides further evidence that the informational content 
' of decisions is important." 
"'Nhat exactly do you mean by informational content?" asked 
Eduardo. 
'J udicial opinions have persuasive value, provide analysis for 
future courts , and explain the application of the law to future 
transactions. In o ther words, they explain the law." 
"I agree that decisions provide a public value through their 
legal analysis," Eduardo said. "But I think the informational value 
of decisions extends beyond that analysis, which relates to my 
point about the definition of precedent. Judicial decisions an-
nounce what the law is." 
"What do you mean?'' I asked. 
"We've already talked about the fact that courts make law, 
however one characterizes the process." 
''Yes, and judicial precedents are the articulation of judge-
made law, in the same way that statutes constitute the law that 
results from the legislative process," I responded. 
"Under positivism that's true," 102 Eduardo agreed. "I don't 
think positivism is useful for analyzing the law that results from 
judicial decisions. An opinion isn't constructed like a statute. It 
101 Un published decisions are reproduced on LEXIS and WESTLAW despite court 
rules that , in many cases, limit or forbid th eir citation in subsequent litigation and deny 
them preceden tial value. See generally William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman , The 
Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts 
of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167 (1978) (describing limited citation and non-publica-
tion rules in the federal courts of appeal). A trend to permit broader citation of unpub-
lished opinions appears to be developing. See Richard C. Reuben, New Cites for Srm Eyes, 
A.B.A. J. , June 1994, at 22 (reporting that the Tenth Circuit recently joined the Sixth 
Circuit as the only federal appeals courts to a llow citation of unpublished opinions). This 
development does not, however, affect the use of such opinions as precedent. !d. (quot-
ing Stephanie K Seymour, Chief judge of the Tenth Circuit, as stating that unpublish ed 
opinions "are not binding and have only persuasive authority"). 
102 See, e.g., jEFFRIE G. MURPHY & jULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 19-33 (rev. 
ed. 1990) (defining positivism) . 
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doesn't have the same clear scope of application to future situa-
tions." 
"But judges clearly do articulate legal ndes." 
"The legal rules we deduce from judicial opinions don't really 
come from the court 's description of the rule. I th ink it's more 
accurate to describe judicial lawmaking as common law adj udica-
tion," Eduardo suggested. 
"How is that different?" I asked. 
"Common Jaw adjudication involves the development of legal 
rules through generalization from a series of analogies. 103 In 
order to find the rule applicable to a given transaction, we look at 
the cases to locate similar transactions. In other words, cases give 
us a series of discre te examples of the application of a general 
principle to a fact patte rn. The examples themselves provide the 
meaning for the general rule." 
"That sounds like a fairly accurate way of describing the use 
of precedent," I acknowledged. 
"The general principle extends beyond the adjudicative pro-
cess," Eduardo conceded. "The process of developing the meaning 
of a rule from a series of discrete examples has been explored by 
everyone from Wittgenstein to Sesame Street." 
"Okay, let's start with the easy one. How is adjudication like 
Sesame Street?'' I asked. 
"Martha Min ow, I think, is the source of this explanation. 104 
Minow explains that the little game they play on Sesame 
Street-'one of these things is not like the others'-exemplifies 
the type of analysis used by lawyers. What she means, I think, is 
that when we use case research to find the rule of law applicable 
to a particular situation we look for cases that are similar in rele-
vant aspects to that situation. When presented by an opposing 
precedent, we seek to distinguish it by saying it is 'not like the 
others' in the relevant way:" 
"I remember hearing about the reference to Sesame Street. 
Didn't Minow discuss this in an address to the annual meeting of 
the Association of American Law Schools?" 105 I asked. 
103 See Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters:" Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 423, '165-76 (1994) (describing the character of common-law adjudication ). 
104 See MARTHA MINO\'.', MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND 
AMERIC.-\.1'\ U.w 1 (1990) (desc ribing the game played on Sesame Street as reflecting how 
lawyers thin!<.). 
105 Minow has used th e example in several of her works, including a speech given 
before the Association of American Law Schools at its annual meeting on January 4, 
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"I don't know rhe exact source , but Minow's point is that 
1 l .. ' . b l "E l ' ' 1ega reasomng mvo.tves rc:asonmg y an a ogy, _ • c uara o respona-
ed. "Minmv went on to consider the difficulties with this reasoning 
u 
process, particularly the problem with determining when a g iven 
case was or was not 'lik-e th e others.' In other words, when does 
difference rnatter?" 
'"'four point then \s the existence of past decisions matters, 
h th t th . ' . ., l t ' '. . -'! t W1 e. er or no ey are ;:ecn mcauy con ro111ng, m oruer _o pro-
v7•d"" !Y'Ul'rlancr ·for fuq;·r..=- "·'r 1·nr <: ""ir·h r~"-: ·o"~cr to rh? 'fPo-..,1 cor,"'e-·- ....... D u ...... .,. - '-....._ ... ..... ·~ · ~ ~ --• ..... . '1.-. •. \ .• .._._.._, .1 ....... .... .... ---- .._.bu ... ...__ . .,J 
f h . . - )" quences o_ u e1r pnmary con. duct, 
"Exactly. We develop an 1.mdersr::mding of the rul.::: through 
b . h 1 . . ~ ' '1: ,. • 1 • o sefVing L e r-esu ts m a S{~n.::s or exarnples. v'nttgcnstem exp1ams 
- -' ' ~ > • h . ' . the process 01 unaerstanu ng con cepts m Lds manner tnroughout 
much of Philosophical lnvesiigations. "' 06 
"I thought you weren't an academic. I admit that I'm a little 
surprised to hear a legal se rvices lavvyer citing Wittgenstein." 
"I am a Crenshaw, after all," 107 Eduardo reminded me. "I 
was also a math major m college. For a mathematician, 
vVittgenstein's writing is particu larly fascinating. Both his material 
on the meaning of language and his mathematical examples dem-
onstrate that a series of exam ples can convey u nderstanding even 
of concepts for which a formal rule cannot be articulated. Think 
about how we understand the meaning of the color 'green.' Can 
you define green? Not easily. But you can convey the concept of 
green quite readily through a series of examples." 
"I don't think green is a concept. " 
"Okay, so I'm not as much of a philosopher as my brother," 
Eduardo admitted. "Let's try to avoid the q uagmire of p hilosophi-
cai debate . The idea is thaE some th in g:s that are not subiect to a 
~' J 
precise definition can nonetheless be understood through exam-
1 , 
p1es. 
"And the r11ore examples you have , th e better your under-
standing of the underlying concept. I see where you're goinp; with 
-----·---- ·------- --·- ---------------
1991. For the text of this speech, see l\·lanha Minow, Diffenmces Among Difference, l UCLA 
Vv'OMEN'S LJ. 165 (1991 ). 
l 06 See generally LUDWIG \N!TIGENSTEI>I, PHiLOSO PHICAL INVESTIGAT IO NS (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trr.ns.) (Macmillan 3d uL 1969) !explaining that our un de rstan d ing of th e 
:iT1eaning of lvords, rules , and other ah~ {rac~ions is der1ved from genera lization about 
discrete events). 
lOi Ed uardo 's siblings are ex u·em e!y well read ~md cite to such authoricies with ease . 
See, e.g., Delgado, Rodrigo 's Fijih Chronicle, su,trra note !, at 1585-1605 (in wh ich Rod:-igo 
discusse3 Aristotle and Hegel). 
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this. If the informational content of d ecisions 1s so substantial, 
. h . , , remov1ng L1em 1s costly. 
"Exactly," Eduardo agreed. "The problem I have with this 
anrument is that, if the cases are relevant for their informational 
0 
content rather than their technical value as precedent, vacatur 
l . " • • . ' ; ' 1 l , ) -' seen1s re1at1ve1y ~ess 1rnportar1L vacat1ng a case S110u. d.n t uestroy 
;ts pe-su--1'-:'l·;·= 1 ':::1 1••? i\r,a' ( "'r'll]Ti>" fr=a~·, r-.·1·1t.)1! r-::::::.hr on D"'1n -~};n ,..-1 ;no~ > • i .:::.L::> I'L Vc .. L.~. " ' -·" c -·.,c..~ce> •-L J'-''-- '·") '-'•,1 .! o'...'L•.H U!«b 
authoriries such as law review articles for their reasoning. Finally, 
'(h~ ...-, ......--..-i"Y""1 .r. n .-..-.. lfl"·i~-ir:- '71·:-' a Cfli;(JP rr~ - _r,l l·-[1]-rn li'-lf'·anh:.• ··,a..::::..]~;1lCJ' 'r 
..lJ.C U}).!.tl~V-• . .:!. 1 C .t.L:Ct~i-::':1 .(__.::") (...' D~.o. .'i ~ ...... :......Ji. ;t;_,,..~-_ ~ i~ li.-L5 .... ' L-V ~'l,_..·~..;.\..1t.. •. b LV 
predict ho\v jtltlges v.,rill clecid~.e tl1e relevant isst1es.'' 
"T '!.--. p s~....--.:.,p ;cr .... n --. ...... rno th ?!7- ···).,v...:. ta11{.ra: ~4 1""011'[ ~a.,..lier r~~a.r:lrri";no-11"' ~.J.l.tc. J~.•-C ~ ,, '"-' L I,·~ ~ ~ ' -~ <:.U ~ ~-~" ~ ~ • Ca« ~'-·"D 
the 11se c)f vacated decision.s for TJreclt.tsior:l rr1ay affect a COllrt's 
willingnescs to rely on o. vac21.ted case for its precedential and / or 
inforrnation.al conte11l~,, I rep lied .. ~ ~'"i!\ rnore serious concer11 is that 
vacatur is usually connected to other methods of hiding or erasing 
an opmwn, such as depublication, withdravval or 
expungement.'' 108 
"You mean the vacated opm10n actually disappears from the 
"" "d' ..J ) d case reporters:' L" uaruo asKe .. 
"Precisely. If the judgment is vacated before the publication of 
the permanent reporter volume, there will simply be a citation in 
the published volume indicated that the opinion, previously pub-
lished at that location in the advance sheet, has been vacated." 109 
"But even unpublish ed opmwns appear on LEXIS and 
WESTL'\. W." 
"Both on-line reporting SeYVlces have similar policies to that of 
West and will usually remove 110 cases that are vacated and do not 
-------------------·-----
108 See Transcript, Kaisha, sujlra note 24, at 37 (question by Justice Ginsburg indicat-
ing that, if vacated opinion is caught in time, it will not be published in the o!Ticial 
reporters). 
109 For an illustration of this process, see the follm,•ing ent;'}' in the offici al reporter: 
EDITOR'S NOTE: The opinion of ti1e United States District Court, S.D.N.Y., 
l'vfason Tenders Council Welfare Ftmd v. A.haty Consiruction Curp., published in the 
advance sheet at this citation, 724 F. Supp. 209·n4. was withdrawn from the 
bound volume because the opmwn was vacated and withdrawn by order of the 
Court. 
724 F. Supp. 209. As this example illustrates, unless a researcher had examined (and pre· 
served) the \;Vest advance sheer;.;, she woltld be unlikely to cliscover that this case involved 
the relitigation of an issue \' tch had been decided in an eariier lawsuit involving the 
san1e plaintiff. The prior lav,:..uit had Cllso been vacated. f·,'1ason Tenders .Dist. Council 
\\relfare Fund v. Dalton, 648 F. Supp. 1309. vacated upon request of the parties, 648 F. Supp. 
1318 (S.D.i'-l.Y. 1986). 
110 The on·line services have procedures for determining which cases are placed on· 
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appear in the official reporters. 111 Of course, if vacatur is d elayed 
unti l the case is published in the bound volume of the reporter, 
the opinion will remain available. But vacatur has the potential to 
destroy even the informational value of a case by causing it to 
disappear without a trace. 112 
"So even if the Supreme Court were to decid e to accord 
precedential value to vacated opinions, future litigants might be 
unable to find the relevant precedents?" Eduardo asked. 
"That's right." 
"I suppose litigants could also take the next logical step and 
provide in their settlement agreement that the motion to vacate 
will also seek depublication or withd rawal of any preliminary pub-
lished opinion," 113 Eduardo observed. 
"If a court is willing to grant vacatur on the theory that it 
promotes settlement, I expect it would be equally receptive to a 
motion to depublish," 114 I said. 
"Isn't there a way that future beneficiaries of the decision can 
prevent its destruction by objecting to vacatur or intervening m 
the motion to vacate?" 
"Courts face one obvious difficulty m ruling on motions to 
line. They report that they sometimes continue to publish cases that have been vacated. 
See Resnik, "Whose Judgment?, supra note 50, at 1497-1500 (describing publishing practices 
of LEX IS and vVESTLAW). It is rare to find a case included on-line that has been re-
moved from the official reporter. 
111 See Fisch, Rewriting History, supra note 5, at 620 n.l63 (describing the general 
practice whereby vacated opinions are withdram1 from the online Reporting Services 
(LEXIS and WESTLAW) as well as from the bound editions of the federal reporter). 
112 Because vacated cases can be rendered invisible, it is impossible to determine the 
extent to which useful decisions are being destroyed. For example, one commentator has 
been misled into arguing that the relitigation costs associated with vacatur are insubsL'in-
tial because of the absence of reported decisions involving relitigation. Henry E. 
Klingeman, Note, Settlement Pending Appeal: An Argument for Vacatur, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 
233, 249-50 (1989). As the previous example demonstrates, the destructive effect of vaca-
tur makes this conclusion unreliable. 
113 See, e.g., Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436 (1Oth Cir. 1993) (indicat-
ing that the parties' settlement agreement contemplated withdrawal of the court's opinion 
as well as vacatur). 
114 Publication of federal court opinions is at the discretion of the judge rendering 
the opinion. The vast majority of trial court opinions are not published. See Jack B. 
Weinstein, Factors in Determining the Degree of Public Availability of judicial O;binions, 2 N.Y.U. 
E!'.'VTL. LJ. 244 (1993) (describing publication system and factors considered by judges in 
publication decision). Some state systems of depublication are more elaborate. For exam-
ple, the California rules of court allow the California Supreme Court to order that a 
lower court opinion not be published. CAL R. CT. 976(c) (2) ("An opinion certified for 
publication shall not be published ... on an order of the Supreme Court to that ef-
fect."); see Fisch, Captive Courts, supra note 5, at 192 n.7 (describing California's 
depublication rules); Loudenslager, supra note 71, at 1239 n.lOO (same). 
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vacate: determining the significance of the decision for future liti-
gants. For example, the Ninth Circuit's balancing test requires the 
court to consider the impact on future litigants and suggests that 
vacatur is improper if the decision has substantial precedential or 
preclusive value. But how is the court to ascertain the future value 
of the decision? Future beneficiaries are seldom present before 
the court; they may not even be aware of the decision." 115 
"If the future parties can somehow be located , are they per-
mitted to defend the decision's precedential or preclusive value in 
the context of the court's ruling on the motion?" 
"Sometimes," I replied. "1n one fairly recent case, the Ninth 
Circuit allowed intervention by th ird parties who eventually bene-
fited from the collateral estoppel effect of the decision. 116 In 
Kaisha, on the other hand, the Federal Circuit denied Kaisha's 
motion to intervene to oppose vacatur, and the Supreme Court 
ultimately dismissed the case for lack of standing." 117 
"An attempt by a third party to intervene does present an 
unusual standing issue," Eduardo observed. "On one hand, the 
standing doctrine articulated in Lujan118 would seem to preclude 
intervention. Subsequent litigation by or against third parties 
would seem to be the kind of 'conjectural' harm119 that does not 
give rise to a case or controversy, 120 especially since it would be 
difficult for a court, in ruling on a motion to vacate, to ascertain 
whether its decision will actually be given preclusive effect in a 
later proceeding, the parameters of which have not yet been de-
termined."121 
115 This was one basis for the Second Circuit's refusal to allow the potential interest 
by third parties in the preclusive value of the decision to defeat a motion for vacatur. See 
Nestle Co. v. Chester's Mkt., Inc., 756 F.2d 280, 284 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding the interests 
of "hypothetical" future litigants to be speculative). 
116 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Seafirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1989). 
117 The Supreme Court found that Kaisha had failed to presen·e for review the pro-
priety of the Court of Appeals' denial of the motion to intervene. Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo 
Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., 114 S. Ct. 425, 428 (1993). In dissent, 
Justice Stevens argued that the inteiVention issue was fairly included in the question pre-
sented for certiorari and further, that if routine vacatur was improper, Kaisha had a 
sufficient stake in the outcome of the motion to vacate to justifY intervention. !d. at 429 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
118 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992). 
119 !d. at 2136 (explaining constitutional minimum of standing as including require-
ment that plaintiff's injury be "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical") 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). 
120 !d. ("[T)he core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of 
the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III."). 
121 !d. (explaining standing requirement that it be "likely" as opposed to "speculative" 
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"£"-Jm-, smce the first court cannot control the subsequent 
preclusion decision, does the potential harm from vacatur appear 
to be redressable. 122 The first court cannot reqmre a la ·i:er court 
to apply collateral estoppel, even if it has refused to vacate," I 
said. 
''On the other hand, the third parties potentially affected by 
the Clecision tc~ vacate are really rnore le,gitimate clefenders o f the 
. - ' ' . . 1 1" . ,. ~ 1 1 . -JUdgment Lnan tne ongma ltlgants, · .t-uuarco contmuecL 
"\Vhat do you mean?'' 
"A motion to vacate doesn ' t present the n ormal adversarial 
·• • · " t d f ' . . 1 • i c •1 • Slttla Ll·On, 1ns ea o_. nav1ng one par t.),. ,on eac1:t Sl·C~e 01 L.ne 1ssue, 
b 
~ . 1 lC}Q -,.. • 1 ..,... 
oit'o pai-tles support, or at 1east accept, vacatur. ·J lndeea, l 
wou ld think that a 'l'nnning litigant •Nould be able to cE:xtract a 
r , , ' • h C • ~ more J:avorable settlement m exc,ange 10r 1ts support o:t vacatur. 
This gives both parties an incentive to persuade the court that 
vacatur is desirable and leaves no one to d efend the j udgment." 
"In fact, I've heard of a case where that's just what hap-
pened," 1 agreed. "An insurance pollution case resulted in a find-
ing that the insurance company was liable. The case was then 
settled and vacated.124 Through an unusual circumstance, the 
terms of the settlement came to light seven years later in another 
litigation, and it was revealed that the defendant insurance compa-
ny had agreed in the settlement to pay $200,000 more than the 
amount of the plaintiff's claim in order to destroy the adverse 
district court judgment." 125 
"Unfortunately, not every decision worth defending has poten-
tial preclusive value," Eduardo went on. "Even if courts internret 
' L 
the ir~jury requirement of Lujan sufficiently broadly to grant stand-
ing to litigants seeking to preserve the collateral estoppel effect of 
a judgment, there won't be anyone to defend a decision that is 
simply an important precedent. Intervention fo r that purpose 
that plaintiffs injury "will be redressed by a favorable decision.") (citations and internal 
quotations omitted). 
122 !d. at 2140-42 (describing the redressabilit:y requirement of sianding); Duke Power 
Co. v. Carolina EnvtL Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 74-75 (1978) (sam.~). 
123 Indeed. counsel for Bonner Mall acknowledged at oral argument that his defense 
of the I'-.linth Circuit decision was not based on the partnership's future inte rest in the 
decision and that he was really arguing as a "friend of the Court." Transcript, Bonner 
lvial!, supra note 31, at 47-48. 
124 Bankers Trust Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 518 F. Supp. 37l, vacated, 
621 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.NY. 1981). 
125 See Intel Corp. v Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. ll 71, 1192 n.32 
(N.D. CaL l9S8) (describing terms of settlement agreement in Bankers Trust). 
r;., .· 
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-V\rou1d certainly be denied for lac1..:. of 5L~nding . " 125 
"A litigant or future litigant's interest in 8. precedent presum-
ably does not constitute the type of tangible interest that gives rise 
to standing," 127 I observed. "AJlmving intervention on this basis 
would open the courthouse doors by groxmng standing to 
nonparties for the purpose of appealing decisio ns with wh ich they 
disagree, as well as prolonging the appellaH~ process beyond the 
" ' .f:' 1 . , • '' j<JO resolutiOn 01 tne mspute. · L' 
ba;:- Sl):Ch claims," Eduardo 
resnonde-d. i'Btlt if seeking to d.::feD.·d .a jtJ(lgrn:::.~t because o f its 
!. ..._, - -
1 • 1 1 , , rr- • • £ ... preceaent1a1 va ue 1s an m surnoent tn terest to conLer standmg, 
doesn' t the converse hold true? Viould n't Article III prevent 1iti-
ga::lts from seeking- and courts fro m grantin g-vacatur of a set-
tled case for the purpose of destroying its p:recedemial effect? 129 
And isn't the court's order in such a case merely an advisory opin-
ion with respect to the continuing value of the decision as prece-
dent?"130 
"Put that way, vacatur seems even less defensible," I agreed. 
"It really seems as if routine vacatur allows the parties to create a 
market in precedents. And part of the point of a system of prece-
dent is that the parties don't have to keep coming back to court 
on the same issue." 
126 See In re Smith, 964 F.2d 635. 538 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing fact that allowing 
intervention by litigants simply seeking to attack or defend the precedential value of a 
decision would violate Article III). 
127 See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-95 (1974). 
128 Litigation by no nparties about the precedentiai val ue of a decision would appear 
to be litigation about the opinion rather than the judgment to which it is attached, be-
cause the inter,enors are not aggrieved by the j udgment. See Transcript, Kaisha, supra 
note 24, at 34 (argument by appellee distinguishing betwee n vaca ting opinions and vacat-
ing a judgment); id. at 36 (question by Justice Ginsburg) ("'v\r;"lat would the sta tus of an 
opinion st;-ipped of the underlying- of the ultimate judgment be?") ; id. (answer by ap-
pellee to subsequent question by Justice Scalia) ("the precedential e tTect ... comes from 
the judgment, not from the opinion. that the opinion is the rationale behind the judg-
ment, but the judgment is what is the precedentia l effect'"). 
129 See New Jersey v. He!dor Indus., 989 F.2d 702, 710 (3d Cir. 1993) (Nygaard, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (basis of appeal or motion to vacate is an o rder, not an opin-
ion; federai courts do not have the power to vacate an opinion where a party is not 
aggrieved by th e order to which it is attached). 
130 Cf Reich v. Con tractors Welding, 996 F.2d 1409, 1412-13 (2d Cir. 1993) (The 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission sought to preserve the underlying 
reasoning of a vacated o rd er ?.s valid p;-ecedent, based on it.s conclusion that, in spite of 
ihe vacatu r which resulted from settlemeN, i!:S analysis in th e decision re mained correct. 
Because the Commission 's opinion was issued after the parties had reached a settlement, 
the court concluded that it constituted an improper and unauthorized advisor/ opinion.). 
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"Not just the parties," Eduardo corrected me. "Remember 
your point that third parties benefit from a judicial decision , both 
through preclusion and precedent. Presumably that means third 
parties can also suffer from an adverse decision." 
"Third parties can't be bound by principles of preclusion if 
they weren't a party to the lawsuit," I reminded him. 
"They could be considerably affected by an adverse precedent, 
though. I would think that certain litigants or industry grou ps who 
expect to contest particular issues regularly ·would have a substan-
tiai stake in the develooment of case law in their area and would 
~ 
be willing to pay to make that development more favorable." 131 
''You're saying an industry group or institutional litigant un-
connected with a particular lawsuit would get involved financially 
in order to control the development of case law that would affect 
it in the future?" 132 I asked. 
"Why not? Even if the losing litigant isn't a repeat player and 
is therefore unconcerned whether the precedent remains on the 
books, there is nothing to preclude a third party interested in the 
precedent but otherwise unrelated to the litigation from contribut-
ing the money necessary to effectuate a settlement on appeal for 
the purpose of having the precedent vacated." 
"So you think routine vacatur would operate 
disproportionately to favor wealthy litigants," I said. 
"Absolutely. The legal system is already skewed in favor of the 
wealthy, who have greater access to the courts and to legal advice. 
Precedent allows those with a lesser degree of access to enjoy the 
benefits of legal rules. Through vacatur, those who are likely to 
face an issue repeatedly in litigation can eradicate or at least re-
tard the development of unfavorable rules and then argue to the 
courts that the weight of authority is in their favor." 133 
"There is clear evidence of insurance companies purposefully 
using vacatur in precisely this way," I added. 134 "And I'm sure it 
is equally possible in other industries." 135 
131 See Loudenslager, supra note 71, at 1242-43 (describing interest of institutional lit-
igants in controlling the development of precedent). 
132 See Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 Lo.w & Soc'v REv. 95 (1974) (describing litigation objectives of "repeat players" 
as including development of particular regime of rules as well as case-specific outcomes). 
133 See Loudenslager, supra note 71, at 1242 (citing arguments used by institutional 
litigants about the "weight of authority"). 
134 See Fisch, Captive Courts, supra note 5, at 205-07 (describing efforts of insurance 
industry to control development of insurance law through vacatur and related practices). 
135 See, e.g., Respondent's Brief, Bonner Mall, supra note 46, at 35 n.19 (suggesting 
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'Thin k of how interested the tobacco industry would be, for 
example , in maintain ing a record of successfully defending all 
claims against it and erasing any decision imposing liability. 136 By 
erasing and hiding any a~verse decision, the industry perpetuates 
the myth that smoking isn't dangerous and that tobacco compa-
nies aren't responsible for its harms. The cost for the industry 
would be tiny, and the effect would be a manipulation of the 
j udicial system." 
"vVby do you consider it manipulation?" I inquired. 
"Of course it is manipulation for weal thy repeat litigants to 
buy and sell j udicial precedents," Eduardo exclai med. "I admit to 
a bias against well funded institutional litigants, because so much 
of my p ractice is based on trying to redress th e damage they do 
to the poor and uninformed, but I don't think I'm wrong about 
vacatur favoring the rich. Only a litigant with substantial funds can 
afford settlement and vacatur. A poor litigant unhappy with a 
lower court decision is forced to hope his or her appeal will be 
su.ccessful. Some litigants can't even afford the cost of that ap-
1 " pea.
"That's true," I admitted. "On the other hand, a poor litigant 
who is successful at the trial level may benefit from the availability 
of vacatur. Consider, for example, the case of George Neary, who 
sued the University of California and won a multimillion dollar 
ve rdict at trial. ;37 The case dragged on for twelve years before 
trial, and Neary, who was getting on in age, was tired of the litiga-
tion. When the defendants agreed to settle the case pending ap-
peal,138 Neary was happy to agree to the settlement, which would 
both reduce the uncertainty of collecting, prevent him from incur-
ring further litigation costs, and, most importantly, get him the 
money right away." 139 
that a banking industry trade group interested in erasing the lower court precedent 
could easily contribute the money necessary to effectuate a settlement on appeal even if 
U.S. Bancorp itself was uninterested in seeking vacatur). 
136 See Fisch. Rewriting HistOJ)', supra note 5, at 622 n.174 (describing successful track 
record of tobacco industry in cigarette litigation). 
137 The jury verdict was seven million dollars. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 278 
Cal. Rptr. 773 (Ct. App. 1991), rev'd, 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992). 
138 The settlement was conditioned on the court granting the parties ' motion for 
stipulated reversal of the jury verdict. The California Court of Appeals refused to grant 
the motion. See Neary, 278 Cal. Rptr. 773. Its decision was reversed by the California Su-
preme Court. Neary v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 834 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1992). 
139 See Fisch, Captive Courts, supra note 5, at 198-99 (describing the Neary litigation); 
Loudenslager, supra note 71 , at 1238-42 (same). 
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"Don't you see how vacatur simply mcreases a wealthy 
defendant's ability to make use of his or her leverage? The cost of 
litigation, the further cost and delay of the appellate process, 
already operate to favor the wealthy. 'With vacatur available, the 
one potential downside for a litigant who refuses to settle before 
trial-the risk of an unfavorable adverse judgment with conse·· 
d.. ' _, +h + h 1 l i quences exten mg oeyona L e presenc case- as oeen rernoven. r'> 
litigant wi th the resources to pursu e litigation can outv,;ait :Jn ad-
versary, secure in the knowledge that if it goes to trial and loses , it 
can erase the consequenct:s." 
"You seem to be assuming that settl·ement and vacatur sten1 
from a litigant's unjustified failure to settle promptly. Thinl'. for .?, 
moment about the counterargument," I pressed. "Couldn' t settle-
ment on aDr1..JC:al result, in part, from the facr that the !mver court 1 L 
decision is aberrational? 140 If the successful litigant rec ogmzes 
that the victory is unlikely to survive appeal, he or she has a great-
er incentive to settle .. Moreover, the losing litigant may be willing 
to pay some amount in settlement, even if the prospects on ap-
peal look good, to avoid further litigation costs. In these cases, 
settlement operates as a form of com promise verdict. 1 ~ 1 By allow-
140 Brainerd Currie's famous railroad hypmhetical illustrates one possibie problem 
with maintaining erroneous judgments: the possibility that such a judgment will unfairly 
operate to preclude a party who has repeatedly defended itself successfully in rnulti-pany 
or repeat litigation . See Brainerd Currie, Alutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the 
Bernhard Doclline, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281 ( 1957) (describing example of litigant who, having 
been successful in defending twenty-five lawsuits, loses the rwenty-sixth and is thereafter 
precluded from defending itself on the basis of o!1ensiYe non mutual collateral estoppel). 
To the extent that this result is unfair, the problem 3eems to lie primarily with the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel to multiple-plaintiff lawsuits. See lVIichael D. Green, The Inabil-
ity of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill it.; Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in [isbesios 
Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141, 144-45 (1934) (suggesting it may be inappropriate to 
apply offensiYe collateral estoppel to asbestos litigation). 
141 We might expect to be able to distinguish these compromises by the terms of the 
settlement. See, e.g., Transcript, Bonner Mall, supra note 31, at 10 (counsel for U.S. 
Bancorp characterizing settlement in which losing party "essentially pays the full <mwunt 
of the judgment" as "in fact not a settlement"). But see Purcell v. Bankatlantic Fin. Corp. 
(S.D. Fla) (Nos. 89-1284, 89-1605, 89-1850), discussed supra notes 79-82. In Purcdl. the 
losing party characterized the settlement as a compromise even though it had agreed to 
pay the fu ll amount of the jury verdict. See Plaintiffs' Responsive Memorandurn , Levan. m-
pra note 71, at 5-6 (characterizing settlement as a compromise because the settlement 
amount was substantially less than the original amount in controversy); Defendants' 
Opening Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment upon Magis-
trate Judge's Reconsideration Thereof at 6, Levan v. C8pital Cities/ABC, Inc. (S.D . Fla.) 
(No. 92-0325-CIV-ATKINS) ("The Stipulation of Settlement ... calls for Levan and BFC 
to pay the class eight million doliars-the full amount of the damages assessed by the 
jury against them in the securities fraud action."). 
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mg vac:crtur, we permit the parties not to manipulate but to rid 
the sysiem of weak or erroneous cases more efficien tly than 
1 \.. 1 " tnroug11 appea .. 
"VV~hy should vve allow the litigants to that judgment?" 
Edv.ardo persisted. "If litigants are unwilling to settle prior to trial 
b·ecause of the novel ty or com plexity of the issues presented, can 
>Ne trust them to determine at the time of appeal that there is 
son1ethin2" wrong with the trial court's decision? It seems to be 
u 
that litigants' openness to settlemem is far more likeiy to be 
infi; ' ""«c,~d hv resoqrrrs •vil1ii1(:rr;,=s;; >o _ ..... ._ .. ~-..;...~'-'~- '-'/ ' v..1...._..._. ~ ' - """tJ - ~ .._.... '--' '- ~ 
re-,.<: ~ h"''lt timing of <l'-lV f'"li"'f an·-'i ·~ 1__:_.1...., -e.._._.•J-~.,_ ~- .:1. J.. I ._. -.i!._~ . .,. . Li.. 
..:::>)r:l-...-~, ,_....,_ ~ -~ ,-......•';' ;1..-.1 .ooro-p -1\~.,.~ ea-~y " 
''-"'c.1ll}J ,C UJ. 'C'- a·- · <l', 
continue litigation, con-
so on-like your earlier 
"Surely the likelihood of success upon appeal will also be a 
factcJr,': I insisted. 
"Even if we believe that litigants vacate only in hard cases with 
aberrational results, we cannot condone that process. First, I don't 
trust the litigants, particularly in difficult cases, to recognize an 
aberrational result. 142 'Would you consider the recent verdict 
against 1\!IcDonalds aberrational?" 
"You mean the case in which the jury awarded almost three 
million dollars in punitive damag~..:s because it found McDonalds' 
coffee too hot? 143 It's certainly a weird result," I agreed. 
"But d oes that suggest vacatur of the judgment is particularly 
appropriate if the parties now settle? Second, hard cases involve 
precisely the expenditure of time and effort that justifies preserva-
tion of the result. These are the cases in which the public infor-
mational value of the decisions is so important." 
"V!hat about the saying that hard cases make bad law?" I 
asked . 
"Prooonents of vacatur would like us to believe that. 14"1 But a 
1 
1 <2 See \Nashington Metro. Area Transit Auth. 1. One Parcel of Land, No. HAR 88-
618, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18485, at *12 (D. Md. Oct. 22, 1993) (observing, in connec-
cion with its rdusal to vacate, that "perhaps this Court erred in its interpretation or 
application of the la:w concerning se\'erance ch!n1agcs, but that is a determination proper-
ly left for the Fou rth Circuit, not pri\'at.e agreen1ent."). 
143 Stt, e.g., Big Jury Award for Coffee Bum, N.Y. Tli\1:-:S, Aug. 19, 1994, at DS (de-
scribing verdict); Jury Says Coffee Vl·i<s too Hot, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 1994, at lB (same). 
The jury verdin was subsequently :·educed by the coun. See Cowt Refuses to Raise Award 
Spili, CHL TRJB., Oct. 14, 1994, at 3; see also Michael S. Froman, Spilled and 
B<!med: Nc;t Open anr! Siwt, CHI. D.\ILY L Bl!LL, Oct. 13, 1994, at 6 (describing factors 
that influence jury Yerdicts). 
144 Vacan.1r returns a difficult legal issue to its former state of ambiguity. This result 
has been defended on the basis that it is better to have an issue unresolved than re-
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litigant can always argue to a subsequent court that the prior 
decision is unreliable . And for decisional law to develop, o u r sys-
tem must retain the novel cases, which are often the hard cases. 
Vacatur is unnecessary in cases in which the result is obvious, and 
those cases are likely to be settled before trial anyway. " 
"Th t' t " I d "Th r . ·1 a s rue , agree . _ e reason so ew CJVJ cases go to 
trial is that litigation costs reduce the value of the judgment for 
both litigants. If the parties can agree on a range of possib!e o ut-
comes, settlement is the economically effi cien t solution." '' ~ 
"So if a case goes to trial, it is often because the litigants had 
very different expectations about the likely result. 116 In that case, 
one side is likely to view the result as aberrationa1." 147 
"vVhich may be how the governmen t views the result in your 
case. Speaking of your case, we should get back to it. I may be 
able to avoid preparing for class, but eventually I have to go teach 
it." 
solved incorrectly. Commentators have identified a value, however, in we ll-developed and 
predictable rules of law which is distinct from thtl law's substantive content. For example, 
the well-developed and predictable nature of Delaware corporation law has been de-
scribed as a rationale for incorporating in Delaware regardless of whether Delaware's 
rules are substantively superior. See, e.g. , Barry E. Adler, Financial and Polilical Theories of 
American Corporate Bankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REv. 311, 339 (1993); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, 
The Stn1Ct11re of Cmporation Law, 89 COLU1v!. L. REv. 1461, 1508 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey 
& Geofffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. 
REV. 469, 505-09 (1987). 
145 See, e.g. , Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and }Hdicinl 
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STU D. 399, 417-18 & n.27 (1973) (nvo parties with a ny common 
bargaining range "rarely" fail to settle ); George L. Priest & Benjamin Kle in , The Selection 
of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1984) ("In litigation, as in gambling, 
agreement over the outcome leads parties to drop out."). 
146 See, e.g., Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White , Economic Anal)'sis of Private Antitmst 
Litigation, 74 CEO. LJ. 1001, 1027 (1986) (uncertainty about th e outcome of a trial 
makes the parties less likely to se ttl e); Claire Finkelstei n , Note , Financial Distress as a 
Noncooperative Game: A Proposal for Overcoming Obstacles to Private Workouts, 102 YALE LJ. 
2205, 2211 (1993) (suggesting that possible explanation for low level of settlement in 
Chapter 11 litigation is existence of greater uncertainty about bankruptcy law); see also 
Lucian Bebc huk, Litigation and Settlem<nt Under Imperfect Information, 15 Ro\ND J. ECON. 404 
(1984). 
147 This leads to the question of how the parties' expectations are atTected by trial. 
Economists often assume that trial resolves the un certainty associa ted with a novel legal 
position or disputed issue of fact, allowing the parties to agree on a post-t rial settlement 
range. See Fisch , Rewriting History, s11pra note 5, at 635. It is possible for one or both par-
ties, however, to \~ew the trial court judgment as aberrational. Such an assessment is 
likely to affect the post-trial settlemen t process. 
r 
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IV. FACING THE FACT OF VACATUR-EDUARDO CONSIDERS HOW 
TO DEAL WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST 
"I appreciate your taking all this time to talk with m e about 
vacatur. Hopefully it isn't at the expense of your students," 
Eduardo said. "But even u nderstanding the general principles of 
vacatur, I'm not sure how to respond to the government's re-
quest." 
"vVhy is the government seeking vacatur of the trial court 
decision?" I asked. "Since the case was resolved, the government 
can't be concerned about res judicata, as it was in JvJ.unsingwear. 
And the doctrine of nonmutual collateral esto ppel d oesn 't apply 
to the government, 148 so the other potential litigants can't make 
preclusive use of your case." 
"I think the government is primarily concerned about the 
influence of this d ecision in subsequent cases," Eduardo m used. 
''You probably hit th e nail on the head when you said the govern-
ment views the case as aberrational. The government attorneys 
have repeatedly warned me that the case will not stand up on 
appeal." 
"Even though the case is not technically binding as precedent, 
it is likely to be influential because it breaks new legal ground. If 
the decision remains on the books, it makes it more difficult for 
the government to take a contrary approach in a subsequent case. 
The government has been extremely conscious of the difficulty of 
continuing to espo use legal arguments that have been rejected by 
the courts, and this concern has led it to become a major defend-
er of postsettlement vacatur." 
"So the government's request in my case is not unusual?" 
Eduardo asked. 
"Quite the contrary. 149 Not only does the government have 
substantial experience with vacatur as a litigan t, but it has champi-
oned routine vacatur as an amicus in Kaisha and Bonner Mall." 
"I would have thought the government would have opposed 
vacatur, based on the factors we discussed earlier, as contrary to 
the public interest in preserving the finality of decisions and con-
serving judicial resources," Eduardo said. 
148 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158 (1 984) . 
149 See, e.g. , Stipula tion [of Settlement before the District Court] at 10, Appendix to 
Joint Motion, Schoolcraj':, supra note 8 (conditioning settlemen t on vacatur of lower court 
decisions). 
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"That '.Vas my initial reac tion as well," I admitted. "Apoarentlv 
.;J.!. / 
' ' . , . . 1 1 d tne governments mterests as a .!.1t1gaLI overroce any ne:ec. to e-
fend the public values threatened by vacatur. 150 In explaining its 
• • 1 ,....., . ....--, \.... 1 . ., ., . 
pos1t10n to tne ~upreme L.ourt, tHe government exp amea tnat 1t 
'is a party to a far greater number Df cases on a nationwide basis 
thar1 even the rr.tost litigio11S privC~. t e ::ntity. "' 151 
'f.--. ' • - ·~ ' ' 'l '" I1 d d ·~~o tne gov•=rnm~=nt 1s tl1e ciasslc ·repeat p1ayer, L uar o 
·-~sno·nrl ea' 152 lL l ...1.1 u ..... . 
;~ies, and you.r victory · ~viJl mak.e it f-1arder for th(e gover11ment 
r:i • • ' ' .h ' . ' , . . . 'I · ' to '""eal wnn tn·e o.om,:: iess m stmsequent ntigatlOn. :..ou recogn1zeu 
that by characterizing you:: case 2s zc significant victory not just for 
Yollf clients b,t f r •r th"'- nom e 1PSS : n P',~,-,p·,-al" '-• ... • ) Ut.. .l.V .. ~......, ..__ i - "'"-' '- _ _._ 0.._ ... - ~ .a ' • 
" ~ ' . k h ' ~~1 ' b ' 'h 1 tnm Lat s :accurate. J. ne case senas a message otn auout 
the rights of the homeless and th e abiliry of the poor to prevail 
• ' .J r • T • agamst tne power anu resources m the government. 1 suppose that 
message is what the government is tl-ying to take away. If the deci-
sion is vacated, the government vrill try to proceed against other 
homeless people the same way it proceeded against my clients." 
"That's right," I said. "Of course, other homeless tenants 
could always make the same argument that you made." 
"The homeiess have limited legal services avai lable to them. I 
think we were fortunate in being able to raise and litigate this 
issue successfully, but I'm not confidant that the average pro bono 
lawyer will be able to make the case successfully with no available 
precedent. I would hope the existence of this decision would en-
courage them to try," Eduardo said. 
"If you believe the issue is worth defending on behalf of the 
homeless, why not simply refuse to settle? You said that your origi-
nal clients had already been given adequate housing, so you aren' t 
11 _, 1 . ' . , compe eu to agree to sett.ement and vacatur on tne1r account. 
"If . ' " 1- "! l . 1 " we don t settle, L1e government w1. pursue us a p pea , 
Eduardo explained. "l\tiy firs t problem with that is my reluctance 
to devote additional resources to a case when the needs of our 
150 Alternatively, the government's position may be defended on th e basis of the 
value of acceding to the parties' wishes and p romoting settlement. See U.S. A.micus Brief, 
Kaisha, supra note 8S, at 15 (arguing that vacz;.tur prorr. o tes settlement); id. at 27 (argu-
ing that parties' imerest in resoh~ng dispLlt·~ outweighs :my public interest in the deci-
sion). 
151 !d. at 1 (quoting United States v. Mendozo, 464 U.S. 154, 159 (198L1)); U.S. Ami-
cus Brief, Bonner Mall, sujrra note 23, at 1. 
152 Professor Resnik describes the government as a "repeat player par excellence." 
Resnik, Whose judgment ?, s1~pra note 5D, at 1489. 
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tenants have been met. It's iaudable to defend cases on the 
grounds of principle or to make the world a better place for fu-
ture claimants, but the Legal Services Center 's mission is a more 
narrow one. Our limited resources are supposed to be devoted to 
addressing discrete legal problems of identifiable individuals , not 
to engage in p ro-active rights-oriented litigation . V.Je leave those 
issues for organizations Eke the ACLU." 
"' , d . h . ' l ,-1" .l can unoerstan your concern wlt , startmg down tnat roa .... , 
I acknowledged. "But here vou have a readilv identifiable class of 
- I I 
potential plain tiffs who will benefit from your defense of this deci· 
. ~r ' ., ' 'k f ' r • h. s10n. t·h.oreover, tne b>:..lL o resources necessary to aetenc! t .1s case 
has already been exp ended at the trial level. Surely defending the 
decision on appeal will not prove overwhelmingly burdensome?" 
"Not if that were the only prob lem," Eduardo replied. "I a lso 
wonder if the decision will stand up on appeal. The trial court 
judge was a fairly liberal Carter-appointee, and I'm not sure her 
reasoning will be accepted by the appellate court. If the decision 
is reversed on appeal, the homeless will be worse off than if the 
decision is vacated." 
''You've identified a valid concern. An adverse appellate court 
decision is likely to be quite damaging to your cause. In addition 
to its greater visibility and credibility, it will have greater 
precedential value , making it difficult for tenants who did not 
participate in the original case to raise similar challenges on their 
own." 
"Isn't it unfair for the government to force me into this posi-
tion?" Eduardo questioned. 
"\f/ell, as you've admitted, the government can always proceed 
with its appeal and seek reversal of the trial court decision on the 
merits. I assume you wouldn't view that as unfair." 
"No," Eduardo agreed. 
"The government is simply giving you the option of avoiding 
defending the decision on appeal. You might view the government 
as doing you a favor rather than forcing you into an unfair 
choice." 
"So you're saying that I can't avoid vacatur unless I'm willing 
to devote the resources to pursuing an appeal that is both unnec-
essary and potentially destructive to my cause." 
"That's right. This appeal is unnecessary because your clients 
' ' l I 'd r h " y , '" ;<. " are no wnger nome ess. _ rorgotten t at, .!. musea. 1t.1ayDe you 
do have an alterna tive ." 
"The mo otness issue," replied Eduardo, anticipating my next 
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thought. "I could argue that the case should be dismissed on 
appeal as moot and that, under Karcher v. A1ay, the mootness does 
not result from happenstance but from deliberate ac tions by the 
government." He began typing r2tpid ly. "If there is no settlement 
agreeme nt, Nestle technically isn't controlling, and the court would-
, ' 11 ' · , I ' . ' h th' ' " n t oe compe · ea w vacace . . tnnH<. we may . ave some 1 1ng nere . 
"The government is likely to respond with the same argu-
. d . D " ' ' 11" - ., ' . "Th ments 1t rna e m v onner inat<, ! warneG mm. · e government 
has typically tal'en the position th;:rt -.;acatur is generally appro pri-
ate when a case becomes moot p end ing appeal, cHmg 
J\1unsingwear. 153 According to the government, this is true even if 
h l .r h ' · r 1 • , 154 t .e mootness resu ts .,rom tJ e conGEC[ o:, tn.e part1es. 
"That reminds me, you said ::v:o Justices had dissented from 
the dismissal in Kaisha, but you never told me what they decided," 
Eduardo remembered. "Did they reach the merits? Is there any-
thing in that opinion that I can use to oppose vacatur in this 
case?" 
"I suppose I d idn't think the d issent's view of the merits in 
Kaisha was too important. It's only the view of two Justices, and 
one of them, J ustice Blackmun, is no longer on the Court." 
"Where the standard set by the Supreme Court is unclear, the 
opinion of even a single Justice can bind the lower courts," 
Eduardo explained. "Remember the Third Circuit opinion in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casry? 155 The court, in a fascinating analysis 
of the stare d ecisis effe ct of p lurali ty and splintered opinions, con-
cluded it was obligated to foliow th e reasoning of J ustice 
O'Connor in the recent abortion cases, 156 because her o pinion 
provided the narrowest grounds n ecessary to secure a majority o f 
the Court."157 
"True, but Justice O'Connor was part of the majority in the 
153 See U.S. Amicus Brief, Kaisha, st~pra note 89 , a t 9. 
154 !d. at 12-13. 
155 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991). 
!56 E.g., Hodgson v. MinnesoL'l., 497 U.S. 417, 455 (1990) (O'Conn or, J., concurring); 
Webster v. Reproducti\'e Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989) (O'Connor, j.. concur-
ring). 
157 See Planned Parenlhood, 947 F.2d at 692-94 (describing p rocedure for identifying 
precedent from plurality and spl intered Supreme Court opinions ); id. a t 719 (concluding 
that j lis tice O'Connor' s standard represe nted the narrowest grounds in the majori ty and 
is therefore "at present the law of the lan d"); Bium v. \\'i tco Chem. Corp., 888 F.2d 975, 
981 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Although there is some awkwardness in attribu ti ng preccdential 
value to an opinion of one Supreme Court justice to which no other justice adhered, it 
is the usual practice when tha t is th e deierm inative op in ion . . .. "). 
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abortion cases," I responded. "The key to that reasoning is that a 
single Justice may issue the determinative opinion in a case, but 
only where he or she joins in the judgment. Justice Stevens' opin-
ion in Kaisha is a dissent." 
"But, because the m ajority didn't reach the merits, Justice 
S ' . . . ' l ~ · ,, tevens opmwn 1sn t a rea, d.1ssent. 
"Well, for whatever it's worth, Justice Stevens did reach the 
merits in Kaisha. He concluded that the Federal Circuit's practice 
of routinely granting the :parries' motions to vacate seuled cases 
1Nas obiectionable an.:::l ino:on:oooriate . "158 J .l .!. l. 
"Did he base his decision on the policy considerations we've 
d iscussed?" Eduardo asked. 
"His discussion of the merits was only two paragraphs long," I 
said, "but it incorporated a number of the factors we talked about. 
Essen tially, he came out against routine vacatur for two reasons . 
First, he said that the discre tion of the court to vacate a judgment 
should only be exercised if vacatur would serve the public inter-
est." 
"Implicitly rejecting the notion that the judgment is the pri-
vate property of the litigants, to dispose of as they will?" Eduardo 
inteijected. 
'justice Stevens explicitly stated that precedents are not the 
property of private litigants. He went on to reject the argument 
that a policy of routine vacatur will encourage settlement, finding 
that although the availability of vacatur might affect the terms of 
some settlements, it was unlikely to affect the number of cases 
settled. He also observed, as you did, that the settlement through 
vacatur represents a false economy if subsequent courts have to 
relitigate previously decided issues. "159 
"Did Justice Stevens articulate standards for the lower courts 
to apply in ruling on a motion to vacate?" Eduardo asked . 
"He didn't se t forth any precise formula, but he did reject the 
policy of routinely granting motions to vacate. The opinion con-
cludes with the point that the 'public interest in preserving the 
work product of the judicial system should always at least be 
weighed in the balance before such a motion is granted. " >1 60 
"It sounds as if at least one Justice is convinced that routine 
158 Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabush iki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., ! 14 S. Ct. 
425, 431 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissen ti ng). 
159 !d. at 431-32. 
160 !d. at 432. 
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vacatur is contrary to the public interest," Eduardo speculated. 
"Nonetheless, I don 't see how his opinion can be binding on lower 
courts," I said, "although I admit that the Second Circuit seemed to be 
strongly influenced by it in its recent decision m Manufacturers 
Hanover Trust Co. v. Yanakas." 161 
"So there have been lower court decisions on vacatur smce 
Kaisha?" 
"Yes. Manufacturers Hanover was, I believe, the first case to 
address post-settlement vacatur after the Ka islw decision. In Manufac-
turers Hanover, the litigants settled their case after the Second Circuit 
had filed its opinion and then jointly moved for vacatur." 16~ 
"I thought the Second Circuit routinely granted such requests in 
the interest of encouraging settlement," Eduardo said. 
"The court distinguished Nestle on the basis that Nestle involved 
vacatur of a district court decision. 163 The public interest in favor of 
preserving the decision is greater, the court said , when a judgment has 
received appellate scrutiny." 
"I can see a basis for distinguishing between vacatur of a district 
court decision and an appellate judgment, but I'm not sure the differ-
ence is all that great," Eduardo reflected. 
"That's why the Manufacturers Hanover opinion is interesting. In 
addition to adopting a different rule for motions to vacate appellate 
decisions, the Second Circuit took the opportunity to expound on the 
public interests inherent in a judicial decision and the destructive effect 
of vacatur on those interests, citing Justice Stevens' dissent in 
Kaisha. 164 Although it didn't overrule Nestle, the court's approach in 
Manufacturers Hanover was almost the direct opposite." 
"That suggests there's hope for me to get a dismissal without 
vacatur in my case after all ," Eduardo said eagerly . "Maybe the tide is 
turning even in the Second Circuit, and courts will be amenable to my 
argument that mootness doesn't require vacatur of the district court 
opinion." 
"Given the Second Circuit's reliance on Justice Stevens' opinion in 
161 II F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1993). 
162 The settlement was reached prior to the issuance of the mandate; therefore, the court 
still had jurisdiction. !d. at 382. 
163 !d. at 384. 
164 See id. at 384 (citing Kaisha, l 14 S. Ct. at 43! (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (arguing that 
allowing party with deep pocket to buy its way out of a precedent is improper use of judicial 
system); id. at 385 (citing Kaisha , 114 S. Ct. at 431 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (concluding that 
public interest in judicial decision may outweigh interest in promoting settlement); id. (citing 
Kaisha , 11 4 S. Ct. at 431-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (acknowledgi ng that promise of judicial 
economy provided by routine vacatur may be illusory, again citing Justice Stevens' dissent). 
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Kaisha, it may also consider his specific rejection of the government's 
argument that mootness automatically compels vacatur. 165 Justice 
Stevens distinguished Kaisha from Munsingwear and concluded that the 
principles justifying vacatur upon mootness do not apply when the 
mootness is ' achieved by purchase. '" 166 
"That reason ing could be important when the Court decides 
Bonner Mall," Eduardo observed. "Well, you've given me plenty to 
work with. What time did you say your class was?" 
"It started two minutes ago," I realized, looking at my watch. I 
franticaliy began to scour the office for my class notes , casebook, etc. 
\Vhen I looked up, Eduardo was gone. 
POSTSCRIPT 
Eduardo vanished as completely as a vacated decisio11. Reflecting 
later on our conversation, I thought about his characterization of routine 
vacatur as manipulation of the judicial system. I wondered if his dis-
taste for judicial sanction of a system in which the litigants can buy 
and sell precedents was a function of his ideological views. And I 
wondered whether, if it reached the issue, the Supreme Court would 
view it with similar concern. 
165 The Second Ciicuit stated that ivlunsingwear did not compel vacatur even of district 
court judgments when a case is settled pending appeal and characterized its holding in Nestle 
as an exercise of discretion. II F.3d at 384. 
166 Kaisha, !14 S. Ct. at 431. 
